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ABSTRACT 
Militant Islamist ideology and the level of attention and reaction it merits from the United 
States government has been the point of much contention and debate within both the 
academic and policy communities. The purpose of this thesis is to discuss the relevance 
of militant Islamist ideology in crafting and implementing the emerging United States 
policy of Countering Violent Extremism (CVE). Militant Islamist ideology provides its 
adherents with a strong sense of identity, motivation towards a seemingly worthy cause, 
and an all-encompassing and simplistic worldview. This ultimately points to the 
importance of engaging with the Muslim community, careful and tactful use of law 
enforcement, and efforts to minimize Islamophobia in the implementation of the U.S. 
CVE policy. Chapter One provides a brief overview of militant Islamist ideology, with 
particular emphasis on how it facilitates identity and what that means in a broader, socio-
psychological sense. Chapter Two describes existing CVE programs in the United 
Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, and the emerging programs in the U.S as well as the challenges 
recognized by each program.  These programs are then assessed according to the lessons 
learned in Chapter One in order to advise ways in which U.S. CVE policy can effectively 
address militant Islamist ideology. To date, there is little certain or validated about how to 
effectively carry out these programs, due to the fact that they are all the first of their kind. 
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Militant Islamist ideology and the level of attention and reaction it merits from the 
United States government has been the point of much contention and debate within both 
the academic and policy communities. The purpose of this thesis is to address the 
question of whether or not militant Islamist ideology ‘matters’ and posit what that means 
for the emerging United States Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) policy. In doing so, 
this thesis will argue that militant Islamist ideology does ‘matter’ because it provides its 
adherents with a strong sense of identity, motivation towards a seemingly worthy cause, 
and an all-encompassing and simplistic worldview. For the emerging U.S. policy in CVE, 
this hypothesis ultimately points to the importance of engaging the Muslim community, 
the civil and carefully calculated use of law enforcement, and efforts to minimize 
Islamophobia. Chapter One provides a brief overview of militant Islamist ideology, with 
particular emphasis on how it facilitates identity and what that means in a broader, socio-
psychological sense. Chapter Two describes the existing CVE programs in the United 
Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, and the emerging programs in the U.S, including some 
challenges recognized by each program.  These programs are then assessed according to 
the lessons learned in Chapter One in order to advise ways in which U.S. CVE policy can 
effectively address militant Islamist ideology. The U.S. CVE policy is in its infancy, with 
only three pilot programs having been established, and as it moves forward it is important 
to do so with informed and tactful precision; this thesis aims to provide useful insight and 
suggestions in that forward movement. 
2 
The policy initiative of CVE emerged as a result of the realization that military 
operations alone will not defeat the terrorism we face today and as part of the wider 
strategic objective of countering terrorism by going beyond military measures to address 
the underlying roots of terrorism.
1
 A flurry of research projects have sought to explore 
and prove what is at the root of terrorism in order to foster an appropriate policy response 
that sufficiently addresses it. The contestants for the root causes ranges from social, 
economic, political, and religious factors, or any combination thereof. As such, CVE 
programs have responded in kind, utilizing social, economic, political, and historical 
contexts in order to holistically address the instances in which violence can arise. 
Generally speaking, CVE aims to produce counter narratives that challenge extremist and 
violent extremist messages using a wide range of activities such as public diplomacy, 
social and educational outreach programs, and targeted government campaigns. 
Furthermore, approaches to CVE also aim to combine hard and soft powers.
2
  
Multiple CVE programs have been developed and implemented across the world, 
and although some programs are more mature than others, such as the UK and Saudi 
Arabia programs mentioned here, they are all the first of their kind. CVE programs 
generally recognize that there are multiple underlying causes, although the degree to 
which each program favors one cause over the others, as well as the types of responses it 
implements to address them, differs from program to program. Such ambiguity in 
approach is largely due to the fact that this is uncharted territory—there is no solid 
                                                 
1
 Diane DiEuliis, “Preface,” In “Countering Violence Extremism Scientific Methods & 
Strategies,” 9, edited by Laurie Fenstermacher and Todd Leventhal. Air Force Research 
Laboratory, 2011. 
2
 Australian Government Department of Defence, Defence Science and Teachonology 
Organisation, “Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Literature Review,” by Minerva 
Nasser Eddine et al, DSTO TR 2522 (Edinburgh, South Australia), 18. 
3 
evidence, neither in research nor in practice, of how to successfully implement such 
programs.
3
 
4
 As such, those tasked with crafting CVE programs are faced with many 
challenges, including deciding what proposed causes to address and how, how to 
effectively measure the success of the programs, and how to accurately identify and 
target the appropriate individuals and communities.
5
 This thesis argues that, as one of the 
proposed underlying causes, ideology should not be dismissed, as some would argue, but 
rather carefully considered. 
Much of the debate surrounding whether or not militant Islamist ideology is a 
cause of Islamist terrorism, and therefore is or is not relevant to crafting CVE policy, is 
concerned with what militant Islamist ideology is and where it came from. Because 
militant Islamist ideology is religiously based, this has led to a heated back-and-forth 
regarding the amount of blame the religion of Islam deserves for producing the ideology.
6
 
Those fixated on the fact that militant Islamist ideology is religiously based often propose 
that it must be challenged on its own religious terms in order to be defeated.
7
 However, 
this thesis argues that it is not militant Islamist ideology itself that needs to be focused on, 
                                                 
3
 Robert B. Deardoff, “Countering Violent Extremism: The Challenge and the 
Opportunity,” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010. 
4
 Amy Zalman, “Countering Violent Extremism: Beyond Words.” The EastWest 
Institute, 2008. 
5
 DiEuliis, “Preface,” In “Countering Violence Extremism Scientific Methods & 
Strategies,” 7. 
6
 Tawfik Hamid, “A Strategic Plan to Defeat Radical Islam,” 74, In “Countering Violence 
Extremism Scientific Methods & Strategies,” 7, edited by Laurie Fenstermacher and 
Todd Leventhal. Air Force Research Laboratory, 2011. 
7
 Emman el-Badawy et al, “Inside the Jihadi Mind,” Centre on Religion & Politics, The 
Tony Blair Foundation, 2015, p. 4. 
4 
but rather what militant Islamist ideology provides its adherents.
8
 Although there is room 
for the argument that militant Islamist ideology needs to be confronted on a religious 
level, such a task is best left to the Muslim community and its clerics; the U.S. is not 
equipped, legally or theologically, to challenge militant Islamist ideology and its leaders.
9
 
Instead, by looking at what militant Islamist ideology provides its adherents, which this 
thesis identifies to be a strong sense of self-identity and purpose, policy makers can work 
to develop alternative, non-violent means by which similar notions can be achieved. 
A large part of CVE-related activities and programs is raising awareness of the 
process of radicalization and how to recognize symptoms of this process.
10
 Radicalization 
can be referred to as the process by which individuals develop extreme views, which may 
or may not include a turn towards violence.
11
 It should be noted that there are multiple 
stages of what has been called the radicalization process toward militant action, as will be 
demonstrated by the various CVE programs described in Chapter Two.
12
 Although there 
is no agreed-upon-exact process, the existence of multiple stages is generally accepted 
among scholars. Essentially, there are the beginning, middle, and end stages, each of 
which merit a different response; someone who displays passive sympathy towards 
                                                 
8
 Dipak K. Gupta, “Tracking the Spread of Violent Extremism,” 46-47, in “Countering 
Violent Extremism Scientific Methods & Strategies,” edited by Laurie Fenstermacher 
and Todd Leventhal. Air Force Research Laboratory, 2011. 
9
 DiEuliis, “Preface,” In “Countering Violence Extremism Scientific Methods & 
Strategies,” 5. 
10
 William S. Combes, “Assessing Two Countering Violent Extremism Programs” Saudi 
Arabia’s PRAC and the United Kingdom’s Prevent Strategy,” Small Wars Journal 2013, 
(hyperlink). 
11
 Tom Rieger, “Not All Radicals Are The Same: Implications for Counter-Radicalization 
Strategy,” 29, edited by Laurie Fenstermacher and Todd Leventhal. Air Force Research 
Laboratory, 2011. 
12
 Muhammad Haniff bin Hassan and Kenneth G. Pereire. “An Ideological Response to 
Combating Terrorism—The Singapore Perspective.” Small Wars and Insurgencies 17, 
No. 4 (December 2006): 462. 
5 
radical Islamist ideas should not be imprisoned in the way that someone actively 
supporting those ideas would.
13
 Instead, it is believed, that those in the ‘beginning’ stages 
of radicalization warrant more of a social response rather than a law enforcement one. 
Considering this, this thesis is primarily concerned with the ‘beginning’ stages of 
radicalization, in which the ideas and sentiments of the Islamist ideology are about to or 
have recently taken root in an individual. This focus on the beginning stages is due to the 
fact that the U.S. is not currently faced with fully radicalized communities that actively 
support Islamist terrorism, such as with communities in the UK, but rather with the task 
of preventing that situation entirely.
14
 As such, this thesis is concerned with arguing for 
the importance of militant Islamist ideology in formulating an effective CVE policy such 
that the radicalization of communities, and thereby acts of Islamist terrorism, are 
successfully prevented. 
Concerning ideology, despite much discourse over its definition and for the sake 
of brevity, this thesis regards ideology to be a set of ideas that make up and legitimize the 
beliefs, goals, and motivations of an individual or group.
15
 In this particular case, the 
ideology being discussed happens to be religiously based; however, many ideologies are 
not. The term ‘militant Islamist ideology’ has been purposefully selected over other 
variations that include the terms ‘Islamic’ and various renditions of ‘jihad’ such as 
‘radical Islamic ideology’ or ‘jihadist ideology’; this choice has been made to convey the 
distinction between the religion of Islam and militant Islamist ideology and the classic, 
                                                 
13
 Rieger, “Not All Radicals Are The Same: Implications for Counter-Radicalization 
Strategy,” in “Countering Violent Extremism Scientific Methods & Strategies,” 25. 
14
 Gupta, “Tracking the Spread of Violent Extremism,” in “Countering Violent 
Extremism Scientific Methods & Strategies,” 52.  
15
 Terry Eagleton, Ideology: An Introduction (London: Verso Books, 2007). 
6 
linguistic definitions of jihad versus the ideology’s definition of jihad. The ideology in 
question only bears a portion of the concepts in the religion of Islam and therefore cannot 
be accurately described as ‘Islamic;’16 therefore, ‘Islamist’ is used in reference to those 
who believe in and support political Islam. The modifier ‘militant’ is used to specify 
those Islamists who tend to use violence as a means to achieve their goals. This violence 
is often referred to as ‘jihad;’ however, as militant Islamist ideology only represents a 
portion of the religion, the ideology’s use of ‘jihad’ only represents part of the concept of 
jihad.
17
 Further discussion on this matter is placed in Appendix A.  
Furthermore, in discussing the arguments for and against the significance of 
ideology, there are occasions in which the words ‘religion’ and ‘ideology’ are used 
interchangeably. This may be confusing given the just-mentioned effort to separate the 
religion of Islam from militant Islamist ideology; however, in the instances where 
‘religion’ is used in place of ‘ideology,’ it is used in reference to religion as a general 
concept, rather than the specific religion of Islam. As a general concept, religion can 
serve as a pre-established set of ideas that can be used to create an ideology, or as an 
ideology. Thus, the desired distinction between Islam and militant Islamist ideology is 
maintained; however, a connection between the general concept of religion and ideology 
is recognized.  
  
                                                 
16
 Indeed, what exactly can be deemed ‘Islamic’ is debatable in many instances, as the 
Muslim community does not have an authoritative body to make such decisions such as 
the Papacy in Catholicism.  
17
 Maher Hathout, Jihad vs. Terrorism, (Los Angeles: Multimedia Vera International), 
17-20. 
7 
CHAPTER ONE: ASSESSING THE RELEVANCE OF MILITANT 
ISLAMIST IDEOLOGY 
 
This chapter will briefly delineate militant Islamist ideology and its sources in 
order to make the argument that the ideology does matter and explain why. This is a topic 
of much contention in both the policy and academic communities. There are those who 
argue that Islamist terrorism is simply the most recent strain of ideological terrorism and 
other socio-political factors matter more; then, there are those who argue militant Islamist 
ideology matters because of its religious nature, causing its adherents to be particularly 
violent because they believe they are divinely sanctioned to do so. Both sides of the 
argument are compelling, well sourced, and likely correct in their own ways; however, 
after delineating both arguments, the case will be made that is important to consider when 
crafting CVE policy, but not because it is religious, or Islamic, in nature, but because, as 
an ideology, it provides its potential and current members with a strong sense of identity, 
a cause to believe in and fight for, and a simple explanation and solution for all that is 
wrong in the world—all of which can be difficult to find and obtain in an ever globalized 
and technological world. As such, understanding this ideology is crucial, not just for the 
sake of understanding it, but also for the sake of understanding what its adherents believe 
they are obtaining in order to find and provide alternative, non-violent methods to 
achieve similar concepts and stem the tide of Islamist terrorism. 
 
 
 
8 
Overview of Militant Islamist Ideology 
In the aftermath of 9/11, Americans were reeling trying to understand what 
reasons those men had for killing three thousand innocent civilians in a seemingly 
unprovoked attack. “The list of explanations offered by analysts and scholars was long 
and varied—U.S. policies in the Middle East (most especially America’s support for 
Israel), U.S. arrogance, imperialism (cultural, political, and economic), and the poverty 
and oppression endemic in many Arab countries were all blamed as the root causes for 
the attacks,” other explanations turned to the simple existence of the United States and its 
characteristics—the freedoms, democracy, power, and wealth of the United States—as 
reason for the attacks. However valid and relevant any of these explanations may be, the 
only explanation that’s worth understanding when seeking to counter it, is the 
explanation provided by the assailants themselves.
18
 Thus, the following section will 
briefly provide an overview of that explanation, as explained and viewed by the 
assailants. 
While it is arguably incorrect to equate terrorism with Islam, it would also be 
incorrect to say Islam has nothing to do with the militant Islamist movement;
19
 through a 
largely selective process, Islam provides the militant Islamist movement with seemingly 
valid religious ammunition from which it builds its ideological arsenal. As the analogy 
suggests, the ideology’s developers and advocates only select the pieces of Islam that are 
conducive to their desired strategy of peace through warmongering; “the jihadis play fast 
and loose with both historical fact and traditional religious interpretation, in order to 
                                                 
18
 Mary R Habeck,. Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror. (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 3. 
19
 Ibid., 3. 
9 
understand their past as they believe it must be understood,” and “to justify whatever 
actions they wish.”20 Through this selective process, they have created, and continue to 
perpetuate, a neatly packed ideology that explains all of history, the future, and the 
answers to their perceived ailments, which justifies their violence. In a nutshell, militant 
Islamist ideology calls for the relentless pursuit of divinely sanctioned violence in order 
to dislodge Western civilization as leader of the world and right all the wrongs it has 
caused; namely the demise of a peaceful and just Islamic society for the sake of the 
democratic, capitalistic, and godless rule of men.
21
  
A fundamental concept to understand and accept, for the sake of argument, is that 
the ultimate goal of militant Islamists is peace. Recognizing and temporarily accepting 
this notion will open the doors to truly understanding militant Islamist ideology and its 
appeal. The catch here, of course, is that the notion of peace is subjective; what peace 
means to one entity may be the complete opposite of what it means for another. For the 
purposes of understanding the current issue at hand, it must be fundamentally declared 
that peace, in the mind of militant Islamists, is universal acceptance of Islam, and more 
specifically, the creation of an Islamic world. Thus, the militant Islamist way of war is 
actually, in their eyes, the way to peace. 
Reliance on Divine Sources. Militant Islamists base their ideology and 
methods of warfare on the divine sources of Islam—the Quran, hadith, and 
sunna.
22
 As described by Pakistani General S.K. Malik, the Quran is a complete, 
perfect, and heavenly revelation sent down by God that is “an unlimited reservoir 
                                                 
20
 Habeck, Knowing the Enemy, 7-8; 53. 
21
  Ibid. 
22
 While it may seem that parts of this section are an exegesis of Islam and its sources, 
such explanations are necessary in order to understand the issue at hand. 
10 
of knowledge, wisdom, science, logic, light and guidance for mankind till 
Eternity;” it is “perpetual and never-ending and free from all forms of mutilations, 
modifications, additions and subtractions.”23 Mary Habeck, Adjunct Professor of 
Strategic Studies at Johns Hopkins University, extensively explains militant 
Islamist ideology (though she refers to it as jihadist ideology) and its foundations 
as viewed by its adherents in her book Knowing the Enemy. While many of the 
concepts she explains are universally accepted by all Muslims, she focuses on 
how militant Islamists use those concepts to pursue their militant and political 
agendas. Regarding the sources of Islam, she states, “because the sacred texts are 
unchanging—and unchangeable—Islam, the Shari’a, and, by extension, jihadist 
ideology, can never be altered.” 24 Essentially, at any point in time, the tenets of 
Islam will always be the same and will always stand true, unlike secular codes of 
law that allow for amendments and abolishment.  
Habeck explains that the Quran and its message are also believed to be universal. 
“Islamic jurists believe that the Torah and Gospels were sent down for a particular people 
at a particular time, while the Quran is for all of humanity throughout all of time.”25 This 
is why Muhammad was sent as the last prophet, or the seal of the prophets; “that 
Muhammad was the last prophet means as well that there will be no more divine 
revelation to alter or adapt Islam to fit in the modern world. It is, rather, the world that 
must be changed to reflect the Quran.”26 Sayyid Qutb, one of the pioneers and most 
renowned militant Islamist theorists, describes this notion in saying, “According to the 
                                                 
23
 S. K. Malik, The Quranic Concept of War. (Lahore: Wajidalis, 1979), 4-5. 
24
 Habeck, Knowing the Enemy, Kindle Edition, Chapter 3. 
25
 Ibid. 
26
 Ibid. 
11 
Islamic concept, the whole universe has been created by God. The universe came into 
existence when God willed it, and then he ordained certain natural laws that it follows 
and according to which all its various parts operate harmoniously.”27 
Altogether, the sources of Islam, and Islam itself, are seen as divine, perfect, 
unchanging, and universal. While most, if not all, Muslims would likely agree with these 
notions to one degree or another, the selective approach taken by the militant Islamists 
regarding these notions creates far-reaching and violent implications for their ideology 
and actions. First, because Islam is universal and unchanging, that means its stories and 
lessons are seen as archetypes that are applicable in every instance––past, present, and 
future––in every part of the world; “the stories, individuals, and nations described in the 
Quran are archetypes that express eternal truths about the nature of good and evil,” and 
“within the Quran are the secrets of the future as well as the past and its pages hold the 
knowledge necessary to understand the plans and intentions of the Muslims’ enemies.”28 
For example, the stories of battle victories in the ancient past “foretell the victory 
of the ummah and the final defeat of the unbelievers.”29 Two specific archetypes often 
used by militant Islamists in such fashion are the stories of the Battle of Badr and the 
Battle of the Trench. The former was the first victory of Muhammad and the Muslims 
against unbelievers and the latter was a battle in which severely outnumbered Muslim 
forces held out against their enemies; both of which, in the eyes of the militant Islamists, 
convey the message that victory is promised to Muslims so long as they have faith in 
                                                 
27
 Jim Lacey,  The Canons of Jihad: Terrorist's Strategy for Defeating America. 
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008), 26. 
28
 Habeck, Knowing the Enemy, Kindle Edition, Chapter 3. 
29
 Ibid. 
12 
God, persevere through hardship and persecution, and fight the unbelievers if 
outnumbered.
30
 Another example, regarding foretelling the intentions of enemies: 
A jihadist sheikh, discussing the reaction to September 11, especially the 
war in Afghanistan and reports that the U.S. government was considering 
an attack on Arabia, said in an interview, “Many analysts and observers 
inside and outside America were astonished by the ridiculous 
justifications…However one group of observers was actually not 
surprised. This is the group of Islamic thinkers that examine the world 
affairs and the international developments and events in light of the Holy 
Quran…Fourteen centuries ago, Allah Most Great, revealed what is in 
their hearts and warned us from becoming allies with them and He 
assigned us to call them to the path of Allah and to perform Jihad against 
them and not to take them as intimate friends and allies.
31
 
 
Second, because Islam is all encompassing and the only way to find peace, 
government by any other means other than Islam and its sacred sources, particularly by 
man, is unjust and seen as slavery. This implication stems from the first and most 
important tenet of Islam, tawhid, or the unity of God. This tenet is clearly portrayed by 
the shahada, which is the creed uttered by every Muslim that marks the beginning of 
their faith. This declaration of faith says, “there is no God but God, and Muhammad is 
the prophet of God.” This forms the basis of Islamic thinking in stating that there is no 
other supreme entity other than God. “Militant Islamists have redefined this central belief 
and given it an all-embracing significance.”32 
Firstly, the unity and supremacy of God means that he is the only being who 
deserves worship, and thus, he is the sole ruler of the world. Qutb said, “people should 
devote their entire lives in submission to God, should not decide any affair on their own, 
                                                 
30
 Habeck, Knowing the Enemy, Kindle Edition, Chapter 3. 
31
 Ibid. 
32
 Ibid., Chapter 4. 
13 
but must refer to God’s injunctions concerning it and follow them.”33 However, as 
Habeck explains, this proper relationship between humanity and the divine has been 
overturned by the dominion of man over man. Given this, Qutb contends, “any system in 
which the final decisions are referred to human beings, and in which the sources of all 
authority are human, defiles human beings by designating others than God as lords over 
men…Those who have usurped the authority of God…are oppressing God’s creatures,” 
and “we reject them all, as indeed they are retrogressive and in opposition to the direction 
toward which Islam intends to take mankind.”34 This, of course, is the modern state of 
world affairs and, in the eyes of militant Islamists such as Sayyid abul a’la Mawdudi, 
another pioneer militant Islamist theorist, is the root-cause of all evil and mischief in the 
world. As such, militant Islamists are wholeheartedly working to re-establish the 
dominion of God on earth and abolish the dominion of man, which, therefore, is 
synonymous with freeing mankind from its slavery to the rule of man. 
Second, if tawhid means that only God is to be worshipped, then it also holds that 
only his laws matter and only he has sovereignty. This means that no man has the right to 
legislate any law, nor does he have the right to enforce any such laws; this right belongs 
exclusively to God alone. “The only role left for nation’s ‘leaders’ is to implement God’s 
laws.”35 This reasoning stands as the conceptual basis for militant Islamists’ aversion to 
western democratic models of government, international law, and the United Nations. 
The laws created and enforced by these institutions are seen as illegitimate because they 
are manmade and deliberately exclude religion. Furthermore, this implication of tawhid 
                                                 
33
 Lacey, The Canons of Jihad, 18. 
34
 Ibid., 21, 33. 
35
 Habeck, Knowing the Enemy, Kindle Edition, Chapter 4. 
14 
also stands as reason for their opposition of modern economic models, namely capitalism. 
There are two points of contention in the opposition of capitalism: one, the Quran 
specifically forbids the use of usury, and so the widely-used practice of charging interest 
is seen as a direct disregard of that rule, and two, “according to the jihadis, God is the 
true owner of all property, and man is allowed to use it only when he does so in an 
Islamic, correct way.”36 Such far reaching and practical implications indicate just how 
deeply consideration for tawhid goes in the mind of militant Islamists.  
All of the implications above, each of which stem from the unchanging sources of 
Islam, demonstrate how militant Islamists are of the conviction that they are working 
towards peace and harmony; the establishment of an entirely Islamic world is seen as “a 
sort of liberation theology, designed to end oppression by human institutions and man-
made laws and to return God to his rightful place as unconditional ruler of the world.”37 
As Qutb said, “the foremost duty of Islam in this world is to depose jahiliyyah from the 
leadership of man, and to take the leadership into its own hands and enforce the particular 
way of life that is its permanent feature. The purpose of this rightly guided leadership is 
the good and success of mankind.”38 
Jihad. Thus far, this thesis has demonstrated the significance Islam and its 
sources hold for militant Islamists; simple, basic beliefs have far-reaching implications 
for seemingly unrelated matters. The religion represents an organized system that is 
meant to touch all corners of the world and all aspects of life. Thus, the rise of the West 
and its secular system of government was seen as a threat to the Islamic system, 
                                                 
36
 Habeck, Knowing the Enemy, Kindle Edition, Chapter 4. 
37
 Ibid. 
38
 Lacey, The Canons of Jihad, 32. 
15 
prompting theorists to turn to jihad, a Quranic concept from which the theorists crafted 
their violent call to action as the means to defeat the threat of the West and reestablish 
Islam to its rightful place.  
The perceived threat began with the Crusader attacks of the Romans and 
European Christian kings, has perpetuated through the British invasion of Muslim lands 
until present day, and will continue until the ‘Crusader threat’ is either defeated by Islam 
or successful in fully conquering and subjugating Muslims. This means that the various 
events of conflict with non-believer entities are not viewed as separate, individual wars 
but rather they are all, in the eyes of militant Islamists, a part of the same war that started 
with the Crusades. This centuries-long war has resulted in the establishment of secular 
schools in Islamic lands, the replacement of God’s laws with laws of humans, apostate 
rulers, and the installation of money and business institutions that utilize forbidden 
methods of usury and banking filled with trickery and corruption. It has further resulted 
in a Muslim population in which the majority of them possess only, what former senior 
al-Qaeda official Abu Firas al-Suri calls, a superficial form of the religion; he claimed the 
Muslim population had forgotten God and instead, “America and the West, their culture 
and ideas, have become the god of the times, worshipped, sanctified, and believed in by 
the people more than they worship God…And there is no longer among them any 
association to the people of Islam except by name and by adhering to a few traditions 
with religious roots.” 39  
This sentiment has been echoed through various Islamist theorists in various parts 
of the world. While Syrian-born al-Suri’s The Call to Global Islamic Resistance was 
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published in more recent years, the same rhetoric can be found decades ago in Egypt-
born Hassan al Banna’s Jihad. In it al-Banna says, “the Muslim world today is faced with 
tyranny and injustice,” and explains that the love of wealth, the wish for glory, and 
conquering using unjust methods are forbidden to Muslims.”40 He goes on to say, “it is 
essential for mankind to have new leadership! The leadership of mankind by Western 
man is now on the decline…because it is deprived of those life-giving values that enabled 
it to be the leader of mankind. Islam is the only system that possesses these values and 
this way of life.” 41 He, and other militant Islamist writers, called for a rising up of the 
Muslim community in order to take back leadership of the world. For example, Qutb 
said, “it is necessary to revive that Muslim community that is buried under the debris of 
the manmade traditions of several generations and is crushed under the weight of those 
false laws and customs that are not even remotely related to the Islamic teachings, and 
that, in spite of all this, calls itself the ‘world of Islam’.”42  
Qutb recognized, however, that it would be impossible for the Muslim community 
to compete with the West in material and scientific productions in such a way that would 
make the world bow its head to them. So instead, he explains they must have something 
more to offer other than material progress, which he determined is their faith, which has 
the ability to fulfill “the basic human needs on the same level of excellence as technology 
has fulfilled them in the sphere of material comfort.
43
 He predicted, though, “those who 
have usurped the authority of God and are oppressing God’s creatures are not going to 
give up their power merely through preaching,” because if that were the case, it would 
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have already been done. Thus, he, among others, calls for a vanguard that will march 
through the vast ocean of ignorance that has encompassed the entire world and fight in 
the name of God to re-establish the rule of Islam, which again, is seen as peace and 
freedom from servitude. 
Similarly, al-Banna explains, “Islam is concerned with the question of jihad and 
the mobilization of the entire ummah into one body to defend the cause with all its 
strength.”44 He also claims that the Quran and the Sunnah of Muhammad are filled with 
verses that summon the people “to jihad, to warfare, to the armed forces, and to all means 
of land and sea fighting.”45 He assures his reader that anyone who reads the Quran and 
pays attention to its true meaning will clearly see the call to arms; “clarifications are not 
required.”46 Most notably, al-Banna argues that the verses of the Quran associate warfare 
with prayer and fasting, “establishing it as one of the pillars of Islam.”47 It should be 
noted that this is a clear example of the manipulation of the Quran in order to support the 
profoundness of jihad. Though not actually one of the pillars of the faith, al-Banna 
managed to present jihad in a way that makes it seem as if it is just as important. 
Examples of this can be seen throughout various texts, indicating just how much jihad 
means to these men, so much so that they distort the one source they hold to be purest on 
earth. 
48
 
The significance placed on offensive jihad makes for a violent ideology that has 
specific implications for tactics in warfare, such as what to target and how to handle 
                                                 
44
 Lacey, The Canons of Jihad, 6. 
45
 Ibid. 
46
 Ibid. 
47
 Ibid. 
48
 Habeck, Knowing the Enemy, Kindle Edition, Chapter 4. 
18 
treaties. Theorists such as Pakistani General S. K. Malik and Majid Khadduri, founder of 
the Middle East Studies Program at Johns Hopkins University, have dedicated works to 
codifying sort of an Islamic equivalent of just war theory in order to ‘wage jihad’ 
effectively and according to Islamic principles. According to Malik, the Quranic maxims 
on the conduct of war are: the art of decision making, the supremacy of the aim, selection 
of objectives, constant striving and struggling, comparative evaluation of situation, 
domination and aggressiveness, will and determination, patience and perseverance, 
firmness and steadfastness, sacrifice, unity of thought and action, security and 
precautions, discipline and obedience, and prayer. Therefore, while the methods of 
warfare used by militant Islamists may seem erratic and illogical, they are actually 
strategic realizations of their deep-seeded beliefs in their interpretation of Islam and 
jihad. 
Most importantly, because the goal of militant Islamists is a world dominated by 
Islamic rule, the purpose of warfare is not victory or glory in any given battle, but rather 
to fight in the name of God and to advance towards their goal of an Islamic world. This 
means they are thinking in long-term goals. This also means that they will keep fighting 
until they either achieve success or are somehow neutralized. For the West, this means 
that no matter how large of an operation is launched against them, no matter how many 
of them are killed, as long as militant Islamist ideology exists, it is likely that the militant 
Islamist campaign will continue. As one scholar put it, “firing cruise missiles at select 
19 
targets is like using half a dose of antibiotics to treat an infection—the infection is not 
cured, but resistant strains of bacteria arise.”49 
Regarding Malik’s maxims of Quranic warfare, the maxim of selection of 
objective draws from the Battle of Badr in which the Quran issued instructions to the 
Muslims regarding the selection of their objectives. The Quran says, “smite ye above 
their necks, and smite all their fingertips off them.” Malik explains that this was said in 
order to direct Muslims towards the most sensitive parts of the body. Thus, it is 
prescribed that effort should be put forth to strike the most sensitive and vulnerable points 
of the enemy. This includes choosing targets that will deprive the enemy of its ability to 
fight back.  
The sacrifice maxim is based off of the Quranic perspective that supreme 
achievement lies in supreme sacrifice, which can be in the form of bearing suffering, 
hunger, fatigue and death. However, it must be motivated by a selfless spirit. “The reward 
of sacrifice is a life of honor in this world and salvation in the hereafter.”50 Not only does 
this legitimize the use of suicide attacks and martyrdom, but it also gives meaning to the 
often bleak and harsh lifestyle of a soldier.
51
 
I n terminating war, Khadduri explains, “the cessation of hostilities by a people 
who had already been promised victory by God could only mean that Islam’s enemies 
must capitulate at the end. For inherent in Islam is God’s power: failure would certainly 
be on the side of its enemies since success could not be divorced from Islam. If the imam, 
or his commanders in the field, found victory difficult to attain, he was advised to have 
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continuous patience for the continuation of fighting until victory is achieved however 
long it might take to reach at the end.”52  If there is a catastrophe a truce may be called 
that will last no longer than the Hudaybiya treaty, which is 10 years. In cases of defeat, 
“defeated Muslims always maintained that their battle with the enemy would be resumed, 
however long they have to wait for the second round.”53 
In the end, it can be said that militant Islamist ideology begins and ends with God 
and the divine sources he handed down to man. Militant Islamists seek to bring back the 
rule of Islam over Muslim lands and to extend it over the entire planet. The era when 
Islam was the law of the land represents a time when the tenets of Islam were believed in 
and actively practiced—all was, essentially, right in the world. Daily interactions and 
dealings were carried out in accordance to God’s laws and the rulers of the land felt it 
was their duty to uphold Gods laws on the earth. This era satisfied all of the major beliefs 
of militant Islamists; God and his law were sovereign and supreme and Muslims ruled the 
land. This society, however, was taken away from Muslims as the West began to rise and 
continue its Crusader attack on the land of Islam. Thus, in response, militant Islamists 
have used the divine sources given to them as a means to develop a strategy that is, 
allegedly, in line with God’s ordained laws in order to fight, repel, and overcome the 
enemy to once again achieve an Islamic world.  
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Determining the Relevance of Militant Islamist Ideology 
In the years leading up to and following 9/11, scholars and experts had been in the 
process of defining a ‘new’ form of terrorism that focused on millennial visions of 
apocalypse and mass casualties.
54
 The prominence of religion is a key, if not the main, 
characteristic of ‘new’ terrorism as it is no longer focused on the conventional, political 
goals that ‘old’ terrorism was. Many scholars allege the period between the late 1960’s 
and 1980’s as the era of ‘old’ terrorism during which terrorism was often secular in 
motivation, hierarchically organized, and discriminate in nature.
55
 Where exactly the 
beginning of ‘new’ terrorism starts is difficult to pinpoint, though many point to the mid 
1990’s, with the ’93 Trade Center and ’95 Aum Shinrikyo attacks, as the beginning. 
‘New’ terrorism, as the argument goes, is marked by indiscriminate violence due to its 
religious nature; “for the religious terrorist, violence is a divine duty…executed in direct 
response to some theological demand…and justified by scripture.”56 Additionally, ‘new’ 
terrorism is believed to typically be networked in structure and less hierarchical.
57
 
Though each characteristic of ‘new’ terrorism has been categorically challenged, for the 
purposes of this thesis, this section will focus on the characteristic of religiosity
58
 in order 
to determine the relevance of militant Islamist ideology in crafting CVE policy. 
Arguments demonstrating the irrelevance of militant Islamist ideology will first be 
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presented followed by those that argue for its relevance. It should be noted that the 
purpose of presenting arguments against the importance of ideology is not to propose 
what matters more, but simply that ideology does not. Where proponents of new 
terrorism identify religion as a key motivation and propellant of terrorism, those arguing 
against a new terrorism insist that religion as a propellant of terrorism is not only nothing 
new but also a nonissue.  
Arguments Demonstrating the Irrelevance of Militant Islamist Ideology. In 
her article “Old vs. New Terrorism” Martha Crenshaw tackles the notion posited by the 
new terrorism perspective that the content of a particular ideology is a direct or 
instigating cause of terrorism by systematically combing through each alleged 
characteristic of new terrorism in order to argue that “religion is neither sufficient as an 
explanation of the cause of the ‘new’ terrorism, in general, nor necessary as an 
explanation of what does seem to be ‘new’ about terrorism.” She argues against each one, 
except for the notion that terrorism has become more deadly over time, explaining that 
“the only characteristic of new terrorism that is fundamentally impeachable is the 
increasing lethality of terrorist action.”59 In general, Crenshaw argues, “what is typically 
lacking in new terrorism advocacy is an explanation for why religion would have only 
recently emerged as a cause of ‘new’ terrorism, given that religion has been a strong 
force in human history since well before the ‘new’ terrorism arose. This fact suggests that 
non-religious contextual factors play an important role in causing terrorism today.” 60  
                                                 
59
 Rik Coolsaet, Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge: European and 
American Experiences, 2
nd
 ed. (United Kingdon: Ashgate Publishing, 2011), 64.  
60
 Ibid., 63. 
23 
Her argument goes on to say that even if and when religion appears to be an 
instigating cause, it is only so in certain social and historical contexts. Neumann (2009) 
explains this context to be structural change; religious identities form in reaction to the 
influences of globalization and modernity as a solution to insecurity and loss of control, 
or humiliation, in the face of rapid and confusing social and economic change. In a more 
specific example, Hegghammer describes the emergence of the pan-Islamist ideology as 
the construction of Muslim solidarity in the face of non-Muslim aggressors such as the 
Soviet Union. As described in a comprehensive study of militant Islamist ideology, “in 
the eyes of jihadis, deliverance from the perceived humiliation is so important because 
this state of disgrace represents a direct attack against the faith itself. 
61
 In these cases, the 
ideology was not the cause of the terrorism, but rather the means by which its adherents 
responded to the actual cause; namely structural change and foreign invasion.
62
 
Also assenting that ideology serves as an insufficient driver of terrorism, Rik 
Coolsaet in Cycles of Revolutionary Terrorism provides a comparative analysis of 
contemporary Islamist terrorism by linking it to the notion of revolutionary terrorism in 
order to shift the emphasis away from ideology and onto “the wider circumstances that 
act as preconditions—factors that set the state for terrorism over the long run—for the 
emergence of a specific variety of terrorism.”63 Revolutionary terrorism is defined by 
Coolsaet as “a form of political behavior taken by groups and individuals in their attempt 
to seize political power from established regimes, both domestic and global, that will 
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result, if successful, in fundamental political and social change.”64 In his analysis, he 
argues that Islamist terrorism is the most recent of four waves of revolutionary 
terrorism—anarchist terrorism of the late 19th century, the separatist-fascist wave of the 
1920’s and 1930’s, radical left wave in the late 1960’s, and finally the Islamist wave 
starting in the 1990’s—though his analysis mostly focuses on comparison to the first 
wave of anarchist terrorism.  
The assassination of French President Sadi Carnot on June 24, 1894 was, as 
explained by Coolsaet, to anarchist terrorism what 9/11 was to Islamist terrorism; it 
marked the climax of a succession of anarchist attacks in France, and was among many 
other attacks in various countries including Germany, Russia, and the United States. 
These anarchists “strived for a just society where private property was abolished and 
exploitation of men by men no longer existed. They were revolutionaries who believed 
that in order to establish this utopian world, the old one had to be destroyed.”65 With the 
invention of dynamite, the 1890’s became ‘the decade of the bomb,’ in which cities lived 
in permanent fear of attacks where kings, presidents, and government buildings were 
targeted as symbols of the arrogance of the ruling class. Across the board, the anarchists 
“referred to social grief they deemed universal and to the injustice resulting from the 
inequality between the privileged and the oppressed.”66 
Since simultaneous attacks had taken place in several different countries, the 
image of a well-run international movement was projected and believed, bringing the 
term ‘international terrorism’ into fashion for the first time. However, Coolsaet argues, 
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“the fact that attacks occurred in several countries at the same time had less to do with a 
well-run international organization than with similar social contexts that acted as 
breeding grounds, or preconditions, for groups and individuals to choose terrorism as 
their preferred form of political action.”67 As a result of his comparative analysis, 
Coolsaet argues that revolutionary terrorism, and therefore Islamist terrorism, is bred not 
by poverty or ideology, but by generalized feelings of exclusion and marginalization. In 
the late 19
th
 century, people began to produce for export, the car was invented, as well as 
film and aircraft; “thanks to globalization and progress in technology, communication 
and transport, it became possible, for the first time in human history, to refer to a true 
world market where goods, services, money and people moved back and forth, almost 
without regard to national borders.”68 This new world, however, was only adjusted to by 
some; “despised and feared, the worker was physically separated from the bourgeoisie 
and pushed to the margins of society.” 69 Such marginalization, Coolsaet argues, is 
caused by widespread and profound social and economic dislocation resulting from 
globalization and rapid technological change.  
In essence, radicalization leading to terrorism always begins with a sentiment of 
injustice and moral outrage. “In the weltanschauung of the radicals of the 1990’s, 
Muslims and non-Muslims alike, the West in general and United States in 
particular…convey the same image as the nineteenth-century bourgeois state did to the 
contemporary anarchist terrorists: the symbol of the arrogance of power and thus the 
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culprit for all that went wrong in the world.”70 Thus, according to Coolsaet’s reasoning, 
today’s militant Islamists probably would have joined the anarchist terrorist movement, 
as well as the radical left groups, and the separatist-fascist groups. “Neither anarchism as 
political philosophy nor Islam as religion is at the origin of the process of political 
radicalization drawing an individual into terrorist violence. It is the circumstances, which 
make the terrorist….’It’s unfair’ has always proved to be a potent force in politics and a 
prime mover for change. When people resent inequity, they are prone to radicalization. In 
itself this is a highly moral attitude. But it becomes problematic from the moment it 
moves into extremism, which eventually ends up luring some individuals into 
terrorism.”71 
Consequently, the argument, then, is not only that ideology is an insufficient 
reason for radicalization, but also that the behavior of the Islamist terrorist movement is 
not sui generis and is actually akin to earlier forms violent political movements. It is 
unsurprising, then, that scholars of Social Movement Theory (SMT) have recently 
incorporated Islamist movements into the theory, further demonstrating that ideology is 
more of an accessory detail rather than a valid explanation. Quintan Wiktorowicz 
mentions that, in actively searching for a new framework for understanding Islamic 
contention, specialists on Islamic activism have begun exploring theoretical 
developments that parallel trends in SMT. Though movements aren’t violent per se, the 
lessons taught regarding them by SMT provide valuable insights into the radicalization 
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process, which is ultimately the process officials are aiming to understand and prevent.
72
 
In his book Islamic Activism, Wiktorowicz and co-authors demonstrate how the 
dynamics, process, and organization of Islamic activism can be understood as important 
elements of contention that transcend the specificity of “Islam” as a basis of collective 
action.
73
 
The arguments posed by Crenshaw and Coolsaet above are, whether or not they 
are intended to be so, examples of early approaches to the study of social movements, 
which were derived from functionalist social psychology accounts of mass behavior and 
system equilibrium. In such accounts, system disequilibrium occurs when exogenous 
structural strains produce grievances and “erode the efficacy of institutions, producing 
pathological dysfunctions that can cause political instability. If institutional capacity 
cannot accommodate newly mobilized societal demands, the result is social frustration 
and political disorder.”74 As such, early SMT accounts posited a linear causal relationship 
from structural strains, to psychological discomfort, to collective action. Examples of 
structural strains included industrialization, modernization, and foreign invasion and 
globalization. “Movements were thus seen as escapist mechanisms through which 
individuals regain a sense of belonging and empowerment.”75 Given the history much of 
the Islamic world has had with many of these so-called structural strains, early renditions 
of SMT fit quite well in explaining the rise of Islamic movements and Islamist terrorist 
movements. 
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Given such an attractive causal relationship, there were those who questioned the 
simplistic formula, which ultimately led to the rise of Resource Mobilization Theory 
(RMT) as a new forefront of SMT. “Rather than viewing movements as constituted by 
irrational or psychologically deprived individuals who join in response to structural 
strains, RMT views movements as rational, organized manifestations of collective 
action….Movements are not seen as irrational outbursts intended to alleviate 
psychological distress, but rather as organized contention structured through mechanisms 
of mobilization that provide strategic resources for sustained collective action.”76 RMT 
arose in response to and to address anomalies in the structural strain model, including the 
fact that structural strain and the distress it causes are ubiquitous, but movements are not. 
“In fact, poor countries with limited resources or political freedom often produce few 
social movements, despite the ubiquity of strain and discontent. Western democracies, on 
the other hand, which enjoy much higher standards of living, political freedom, and 
stability, are ripe with robust movements.”77 Early strain models also tended to disregard 
the political and organized nature of movements; “movements are not merely 
psychological coping mechanisms, they are often explicitly focused and directed toward 
the political arena.”78 These anomalies meant that central questions about the emergence 
of and dynamics of Islamic activism could not be addressed. For example, why do some 
groups use violence while others eschew it, and under repressive conditions, how do 
movements collectivize individual grievances and mobilize participants? RMT seeks to 
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address these questions among others, fine tuning SMT where structural strain models 
did not. 
As the name indicates, RMT suggests the need for resources and mobilizing 
structures in order to collectivize individual grievances and to bring money, support, 
media attention, and alliances to the movement. Without these, movements will likely be 
unable to truly get off the ground and become effective in producing desired change. The 
mosque is an obvious mobilizing structure for Islamic activism, preaching and 
disseminating religious messages as well as providing its members with a network, a vital 
resource, which connects them across space. Other mobilizing structures include Islamic 
NGOs and student organizations; such structures provide goods and services like medical 
clinics, culture centers, and charities, which reinforce solidarity ties and demonstrate 
examples of what Islam can provide in comparison to other non-Islamic structures. Such 
examples are often used as leverage and proof for the claim that “Islam is the solution” to 
all problems, physical and spiritual. “These organizations represent a friendly public face 
that promotes the Islamic message without directly confronting the regime,” providing 
and participating in activities that inadvertently “highlight the inability of the state to 
effectively address socioeconomic problems.”79 Activists capture and usurp these 
resources and structures to solidify the movement and further disseminate the 
movement’s message. 
The utility of these structures, other than of the raw services provided, lies in their 
ability to articulate and disseminate frameworks of understanding that resonate with 
potential participants and the public to elicit collective action. According to David Snow 
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and Robert Benford, social movements utilize this ability, commonly referred to as 
framing, in three ways; first, movements diagnose a condition as a problem that is in need 
of redress, second, movements offer solutions to the problem including tactics and 
strategies on how to achieve those solutions, and third, they provide rationale to motivate 
support and collective action.
80
 The framing process will be most successful in the 
instances where frame resonance is established; “the ability of a movement to transform a 
mobilization potential into actual mobilization is contingent upon the capacity of a frame 
to resonate with potential participants. Where a movement frame draws upon indigenous 
cultural symbols, language, and identities, it is more likely to reverberate with 
constituents, thus enhancing mobilization.”81 Islam is ripe with its own distinct culture, as 
well as a rich and complicated history, both of which extend across multiple ethnicities 
and countries, making frame resonance, and therefore collective mobilization, quite easy 
to achieve. 
If one focuses on the case of Islamic activism without the broader reference frame 
of SMT, it’s reasonable to conceive that Islam is the ‘problem’. Indeed, all the elements 
that are attributed by SMT as necessary and/or sufficient for the start and sustainment of 
a movement are readily and easily provided by Islam; it provides multiple, well-
established mobilizing structures that provide its members and the public vital resources 
for the life of a movement such as networks, money, and media attention, and it serves as 
a common historical background from which activists can build frame resonance. 
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However, with the broader reference frame of SMT in mind, it’s clear that these elements 
are consistent across all movements, such as the Civil and Gay Rights movements. 
Considering this, it becomes evident that Islamic movements are simply another cut from 
the same cloth, and that Islam and its affiliates (Islamism, jihadism, etc) are only the 
means by which its adherents have responded to further underlying causes. 
Arguments Supporting the Relevance of Militant Islamist Ideology. 
Regardless of how compelling or valid the above arguments may be, there is no denying 
that Islamist terrorism and its ideology do, at least superficially, stem from the religion of 
Islam; “without the beliefs, values, principles, and objectives of ideology, its (Islamist 
terrorism) methods and ends could neither be articulated nor legitimized in the eyes of its 
sympathizers. 
82
 Essentially, without the religion, there would be no militant Islamist 
ideology. It is this religiosity that leads many scholars, such as those advocating a ‘new 
terrorism’ mentioned above, to be convinced of its importance. “Monotheistic faiths are 
characterized by exclusive claims to valid identity and access to salvation. The violent 
imagery embedded in their sacred texts… establish the legitimacy of killing as an act of 
worship with redemptive qualities. In these narratives, the enemy must be eradicated, not 
merely suppressed.” Islamist terrorism, and its other religiously motivated counterparts 
including Christian and Jewish fundamentalism, are thus described to be distinctly 
concerned with cosmic, moral values purported by the faith, which therefore makes it 
more lethal and indiscriminate, arguably leaving few policy options for the United States.  
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Although religious terrorism has been around for centuries (albeit not being called 
terrorism in its earliest years), it has seen a distinct increase in existence and occurrence 
in recent decades. According to Magnus Ranstorp, by 1996, the number of religious 
fundamentalist movements had tripled since the mid-1960’s. 83 Similarly, according to 
Nadine Gurr and Benjamin Cole, only two out of 64 international terrorist groups in 1980 
could be identified as religious, compared to 25 out of 58 in 1995. Although scholars of 
religious terrorism recognize the contribution of non-religious elements towards its rise, it 
is argued that they are more so predisposing factors rather than sufficient causes. Instead, 
it is the groups’ religious, millenarian-apocalyptic beliefs that are seen as sufficient for 
their existence and as reason for their excessively lethal nature.  
In her discussion on why religious movements become violent, L. L. Dawson first 
and foremost recognizes apocalyptic, religious beliefs, namely by the three Abrahamic 
religions.  
The refrains of apocalyptic rhetoric can be heard throughout history and the 
world, though they are most pronounced in the three great religious traditions of 
the West; Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Each of these traditions rests on a core 
of millennialist beliefs and expectations, expressed repeatedly in the prophecies 
and perceived codes of their scriptures,” and “in times of particular social distress 
and disorder, and even more under the influence of charismatic prophets, the 
relatively passive popular response to apocalyptic beliefs can result in more 
dangerous forms of social and even political activism.
84
 
 
Millennialism refers to the fundamental eschatological belief that the end of time, 
or apocalypse, is imminent, at which point God will judge the living and the dead and 
bring peace on earth. Driven by such imminence, millenarian-apocalyptic believers are 
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inclined to revolt against the sociopolitical order in an attempt to bring about the 
promised kingdom of peace.
85
 As Richard Landes explains, apocalyptic millennial beliefs 
have a significant direct impact on history because they call for active participation in 
revolutionizing history.
86
 It is this millenarian-apocalypticness, particularly, that 
ultimately distinguishes militant Islamist ideology and its other religiously motivated 
terrorist counterparts from ‘traditional,’ politically driven terrorism.  
Such religious millenarian-apocalyptic beliefs lead its violent perpetrators to 
perceive themselves as unconstrained by the political, moral, and practical constraints of 
the modern world; “believers are cosmic warriors in the battle with evil…no longer 
bound by customary rules, no longer prisoners of conventional expectations…They live 
in an enchanted and exciting world, and they want nothing more than to bring the rest of 
us in it. Or, if we refuse, they will bring it to us.”87 As such, violence is a religious duty in 
the war between good and evil, in which non-believers are dehumanized because they are 
infidels or apostates. “When they look at humanity, many see not a wide and nuanced 
spectrum of people, but a few saints and a vast sea of sinners, some redeemable, some 
(most) not. They are quite clear on who will suffer punishment, and who will gain reward 
at the final Revelation. And when they believe the moment has come, they do not believe 
in compromise.”88 This disposition leads, almost naturally, to indiscriminate violence that 
is markedly more lethal than political terrorism.  
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Instances of such deadly and indiscriminate violence are not hard to find across 
various religions. As Bruce Hoffman explains, examples can be found within militant 
Christian white supremacists as well as in some radical Jewish messianic movements. 
89
 
He refers to the indictment of 14 American white supremacists in 1987 for plotting to 
poison municipal water supplies in two U.S. cities as well as the conviction of Israeli 
fanatics in 1984 for plotting to blow up the Dome of the Rock. Hoffman also refers to the 
violence perpetrated by Sikh’s in India against Hindu’s, albeit recognizing there is a lack 
of millenarian-apocalyptic visions. The use of suicide attacks has also been argued as 
another indication of the distinct lethality and indiscrimination of religious terrorism; 
“whereas most action by ‘old’ terrorists involved an escape plan, ‘new’ terrorists seem 
more willing to give their own life while orchestrating a terrorist attack…new terrorists 
are more prepared to die because martyrdom is seen as a way of reaching heaven.”90 
In regards to policy implications, some scholars have claimed that such 
destructive and un-earthly inclinations leave few policy options for the U.S. Indeed, the 
sentiment is, ‘what are we going to do in the face of such outlandish violence? How do 
we try and negotiate or use diplomacy to achieve peace with an enemy that figuratively 
speaks, thinks, and operates according to their own religious rule and deliberately 
disregards ours?’ Magnus Ranstorp ended his pre-9/11 article saying, “At present, it is 
doubtful that the United States or any western government is adequately prepared to meet 
this challenge.”91 Steve Simon started his post-9/11 article saying, 
The social, economic, and political conditions in the Arab and broader Islamic 
world that have helped give rise to al-Qaeda will not be easily changed. The 
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maximalist demands of the new terrorists obviate dialogue or negotiation. 
Traditional strategies of deterrence by retaliation are unlikely to work, because the 
militant Islamists have no territory to hold at risk, seek sacrifice, and court 
Western attacks that will validate their claims about Western hostility to Islam.
92
 
 
Thus, Simon describes prospects for successful policy options as bleak and 
ultimately suggests “a strategy of containment, while seeking ways to redress, over the 
long run, underlying causes.”93 Indeed, after over a decade of largely kinetic operations 
against our enemy, and the rise of ISIS, a deadlier al-Qaeda, Simon’s strategy of ‘contain 
while figuring something else out’ arguably reflects the U.S. strategy to date. 
When looked at through the lens of religious, ‘new’, millenarian-apocalyptic 
terrorism, particularly that of militant Islamist ideology, perceptions of hopelessness or 
bleak prospects as just described are understandable. When looked at through the lens of 
the arguments and theories in the section above, however, such millenarian-apocalyptic 
motivations seem less alarming. Undoubtedly, the degree to which militant Islamist 
ideology matters is arguably one of the most contentious debates of national security, 
with each side adamantly supporting their argument and disproving the other.  After 
careful deliberation over variations of both sides of the argument, this thesis argues that 
ideology is relevant, but not because it is religious, or Islamic, in nature, but because as 
an ideology, it provides its potential and current members with a strong sense of identity, 
a cause to believe in and fight for, and a simple explanation and solution for all that is 
wrong in the world. 
                                                 
92
 Steven Simon, “The New Terrorism: Securing the Nation Against a Messianic Foe,” 
The Brookings Review 21, no. 1 (2003), doi:10.2307/20081085, 1. 
93
 Ibid., 18. 
36 
Various scholars have noted the importance of developing a distinct identity for 
youth development.
94
 Accomplishing the task of creating a distinct identity, and thereby a 
sense of purpose, fosters healthy development and psychological ease. Adolescent 
psychiatrist Lois Flaherty explains that youth years, those of the early 20s, are a time of 
consolidation of identity during which individuals are unsettled, trying to work out their 
place in the world, and are determined to make a difference through changing themselves 
or the outside world. By the time the individual reaches young adulthood, ties with 
parents have been loosened and identity consolidation has largely been achieved. The 
next phase involves a transitional period between late adolescence and adulthood in 
which “fitting in, being accepted, and feeling good about oneself—sustaining a sense of 
dignity and self-esteem—are the key developmental tasks of this era.”95 If these tasks are 
sufficiently achieved, the end result is an established identity with an understanding of 
where it fits within society. However, if these tasks are not achieved, “the result may be a 
sense of not fitting in, not accomplishing anything worthwhile, not making any 
difference, and being unimportant.”96 
Concurrently, Flaherty explains that developing a cultural and ethnic identity is 
another important feature in late adolescence. Cultural identity, as described by Flaherty, 
“involves the story of one’s people and how they came to be where they now are in the 
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world.”97 Wexler describes cultural identity as “recognizing one’s cultural attributes—
beliefs, values, practices, norms, traditions, and heritage—along with understanding how 
they are (and are not) reflected in one’s self. These cultural attributes are both internally 
and externally defined, as they come from personal choices as well as ascriptions of 
others.”98 
In the simplest of situations, a consonance exists between all of these points of 
reference. The views of one’s family, school, and friends regarding life are 
basically similar, resulting in patterned interactions with the environment that 
reflects one’s views of oneself and are mutually reinforcing. In times of rapid 
social change and a high degree of social mobility or when social institutions such 
as schools espouse different ideas from parents’…dissonance is likely to be the 
rule. Whatever the case, the individual is still faced with the task of sorting out for 
himself or herself a separate and unique identity. A daunting task at best, but 
much more difficult when the choices are seen as offering no rewards. 
 
During this process, youth are looking for something strong and dependable to 
believe in, and their choices are limited by the available possibilities--any mentor, group, 
or activity that is accessible could facilitate the process. Establishing a cultural identity 
“helps individuals find their place in larger temporal and social contexts and situates 
them as actors in their community and in the world. This is important developmentally 
since young people tend to do better if they identify with values that transcend 
themselves.”99 Such cultural identity, of course, reinforces a sense of individual identity; 
Joane Nagel illustrated how the civil rights movement in the 1960s and 1970s encouraged 
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American Indian individuals to claim their native ancestry such that the U.S. Census 
recorded triple the number of people claiming American Indian heritage.
100
 
In the case where individual and cultural identities are insufficiently developed, 
the perception may be that the misery (caused by the lack of a distinct identity) is caused 
by outside persons or groups. Such perceptions can also be shared by an entire group of 
people, “strengthened and reinforced within the community, and transmitted from one 
generation to the next.
101
 In these cases, “ideologies that pin the cause of anomie on an 
enemy and groups that offer the individual a sense of purpose and self-worth by rejecting 
the system are naturally appealing.”102 Becoming a part of these groups and adopting 
their ideologies one puts on “trappings of power and superiority by adopting an ideology 
that tells them they are special, important, and have a glorious role to play…. thus, 
belonging to the group and believing in its ideology protect against the shame and 
humiliation that the youth would otherwise feel.”103 
Considering all of this, it is facile to see how militant Islamist ideology can and 
does provide individuals with a sense of identity. Firstly, militant Islamist ideology’s use 
of Quranic archetypes readily explains history, the present, and the future as explained 
earlier. This allows those attracted to militant Islamist ideology to have an understanding 
of their cultural history, its story of how it came to be, and where it stands now, as 
Flaherty described. As the story goes, the Crusaders of the West have been actively 
attacking Islamic lands and working to subjugate Muslims across the world for centuries 
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to achieve godless power. As a result, the once great Kingdom of Islam has been 
dismantled and its Muslims have been forced to live in conditions of poverty, despair, 
and godlessness. This helps the individual place themselves within the larger temporal 
and social context of that history as an active member of the community as Wexler 
explained. Militant Islamist ideology’s blaming of the West and apostates also helps the 
individual make sense of their misery as someone else’s fault. Thus, the individual 
assumes the identity as a Muslim participating in the wider Islamist mission to reinstate 
Islam as the law of the land. This cultural and individual identity gives the individual the 
key post-adolescent elements of purpose, self-esteem, and dignity; it fulfills the need to 
find meaning in life. 
To demonstrate, Maajid Nawaz, a former member of Hizbu-al-Tahrir (HT), 
describes his path towards and away from being a radical Islamist in his book Radical. 
Nawaz, of Pakistani descent, was born in the seventies and grew up in the predominantly 
white neighborhood of Southend in Essex, England. Growing up in England meant 
Nawaz did not readily identify with his Pakistani culture; however, growing up as a 
member of a minority in England meant that he also did not feel affiliated to England.
104
 
Furthermore, with the rise in concern for AIDS in the mid-eighties as well as the rise in 
skinhead, neo-Nazi culture, Nawaz was consistently on the receiving end of racism and 
prejudice, from both his peers as well as the authorities, throughout his adolescence. 
Initially, hip-hop music and culture provided Nawaz and his fellow ethnic friends with a 
sense of identity and purpose; in describing his acclamation to hip-hop culture Nawaz 
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said, “we felt we had a way to fight back,”105 and that they “were buzzing on a sound, an 
identity, that we could finally claim as our own”106 
However, Nawaz’s experience with racism and prejudice grew increasingly 
violent with multiple knife fights and unfair run-ins with the police. Meanwhile, Islamist 
groups and ideology were on the rise across the world in response to the war in Bosnia. 
“In Bosnia, white, blond-haired, blue-eyed indigenous European Muslims were being 
massacred just because they were Muslim…In reaction to these atrocities, Muslims in 
Europe began asserting their religious identities even more.”107 At the brink of another 
knife fight, Nawaz’s brother, already a committed Islamist, managed to avoid the fight by 
identifying himself as an Islamist terrorist; “I told him we’re Muslims and we don’t fear 
death. We’re like those Palestinian terrorists he sees on the televisions blowing up 
planes.”108 Their opponents backed down, scared, “and that came from the assertive new 
identity Osman [brother] had adopted. Islamism. It had done what years of knife fights 
could not. It had won the psychological war and defeated our enemy...In one 
conversation, Islamism did what hip-hop couldn’t do”109  
That moment was the first time Nawaz realized the power of Islamism and he 
wanted more. “I realized Islamism could give me the respect that I’d craved since 
primary school”110 As a result, Nawaz moved to London to become an active member of 
HT, living in a house with other members, attending study groups, and lobbying for their 
cause. “So there was a real vacuum in my identity, which was the ideal place for someone 
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to be before recruitment to an Islamist organization. They [HT] were able to offer me an 
identity that had previously been absent”111; “after the typical town atmosphere of 
Southend, and the feeling of being part of a fractional minority, I now felt plugged into a 
far larger community, a thriving London network buzzing with ideas.”112 
Thus, as Nawaz’s experience demonstrates, Islamist and militant Islamist 
ideologies provide those susceptible to them with identity, purpose, and motivation, 
validating the relevance of the ideology. The arguments and theories posited by 
Crenshaw, Coolsaet, and others may suggest militant Islamist terrorism is just another cut 
of the same cloth, and that terrorism is not new and religious terrorism is not special; 
however, that does not mean that militant Islamist ideology lacks significance in 
comparison to other driving factors. Furthermore, though scholars of ‘new’ terrorism and 
millenarian-apocalyptic ideologies suggest the religious nature of religious terrorism 
serve as a legitimizing factor for violence and causes its adherents to operate according to 
their own, cosmic rules, this thesis argues that those characteristics are not what make 
militant Islamist ideology significant. Describing and distinguishing the religious nature 
of the Islamist ideology does little in the way of stemming its tide, and instead, suggests 
that little can be done or worse, that the religion of Islam as a whole is the problem. Thus, 
in considering the lessons in the above section, this thesis proposes considering what 
militant Islamist ideology provides its adherents rather than what it is as reason for its 
relevance. Dawson mentions an old adage in her article, which states that no one joins a 
dangerous cult or terrorist cell. “Converts invariably see the act of joining in positive 
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terms, as beneficial for both themselves, their society, and the cosmos.”113 Thus, in 
looking at militant Islamist ideology through the lens of identity, it becomes apparent 
what benefits its adherents believe they are getting, which happen to be benefits that can 
be easily provided elsewhere, through other non-violent means. This, arguably, is where 
CVE should begin. 
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CHAPTER TWO: OVERVIEW OF CVE POLICIES IN THE UK, SAUDI 
ARABIA, AND THE U.S. 
 
The initiative of CVE emerged as part of the wider strategic objective of 
countering terrorism by going beyond military measures and addressing the underlying 
roots of terrorism through multi-faceted programs. The purpose of this chapter is to 
explore the CVE initiatives in the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, and the emerging 
programs in the U.S in order to discover ways in which the U.S. can effectively address 
militant Islamist ideology per the lessons learned in Chapter One. While the programs in 
the UK and Saudi Arabia are each profoundly shaped by cultural, political, and legal 
elements unique to its country, they bear significant characteristics and challenges that 
could benefit the U.S. in its implementation of its own CVE programs. 
       CVE arose in response to the various terrorist attacks that took place across 
the world in the early 2000’s. Generally speaking, CVE aims to produce counter 
narratives that challenge extremist and violent extremist messages using a wide range of 
activities such as public diplomacy, social and educational outreach programs and 
targeted government campaigns in addition to existing security measures.
114
 A large part 
of these activities is an effort to raise awareness of the process of radicalization and how 
to recognize symptoms of this process.
115
 Essentially, due to the multi-dimensional nature 
of the radicalization process and of terrorism, CVE programs have responded in kind, 
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utilizing social, economic, political and historical contexts in order to holistically 
approach the instances in which violence can arise.
116
 Furthermore, “approaches to CVE 
generally aim to combine hard and soft powers. Hard powers being means to achieve 
desired outcomes via the use of military and economic sanctions, soft power being power 
that 'co ops people rather than coerces them.”117 Given the recent rise of CVE as a policy 
initiative, it is noteworthy that there is, thus, little empirical evidence to go off and 
therefore a lack of conclusive scholarship on what exactly CVE is, how it should be done 
and its positive and negative effects. Regardless, in a recent literature review of CVE, 
Nasser-Eddine and other scholars found that despite the lack of concrete definitions, CVE 
“stands as a phenomenon that is both self evident and taken for granted,” and “the 
dominant frame for understanding the threat of violent extremism and terrorism, as 
presented in the contemporary literature, is that of transnational Islamist networks.”118 
Indeed, the programs within the UK, Saudi Arabia, and the U.S. fall within that 
framework. 
 
UK’s Prevent Strategy  
Following the 2005 London subway bombings, the UK recognized that it needed 
to tackle support for, and the promotion of, violent Islamist ideologies within British 
society. This resulted in the creation of Prevent, an add-on to the UK’s existing counter 
terrorism strategy, CONTEST. In 2011, the UK government published a revised 
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CONTEST, and therefore Prevent strategy, that corrected various flaws that surfaced in 
the early stages of implementation, and committed to issuing annual updates on its 
counterterrorism policies. As per the 2011 revision, the aim of Prevent is to “stop people 
from becoming terrorists or supporting them.”119 The most recent annual report of 2014 
identifies that while no terrorist attack had occurred in the UK during 2014, the frequency 
of terrorist attacks worldwide had increased about 40%, to 12,000 in 2013, and with the 
rise of the group known as ISIL, or Daesh, in Iraq and Syria, the threat level for the UK 
was raised to ‘SEVERE’ from ‘SUBSTANTIAL.’120  
Aspects of the Prevent strategy published in 2011 continue to be executed; 
however, due to the evolving nature of the threat, the 2014 annual report has 
implemented a change in emphasis. The 2011 revision of CONTEST and its Prevent 
components was in response to rising criticisms that the strategy was narrowly focused 
on the Muslim community and needed to, instead, address all forms of extremism. Thus, 
the 2011 revision made it a point to broaden its scope
121
; however, due to the evolving 
nature of the threat since 2011, the 2014 report specifically identifies militant Islamist 
terrorists as the principal threat to the UK, most notably those in Iraq in Syria. This is 
also a change from the 2011 publishing, where al Qaeda and its affiliates were identified 
as the biggest terrorist threat. The 2014 report does mention, however, that there were 
several attempted attacks on army recruitment centers by “Dissident Republicans,” 
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indicating that a threat from Northern Ireland Related Terrorism does still exist. Far right 
extremism is also identified as a threat but is described as low in comparison to the 
principal threat of Daesh and other Islamist terrorists.  
Given this context, the specific objectives of the Prevent strategy are: 
1. Respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat we face from 
those who promote it; 
 
2. Prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure that they are given 
appropriate advice and support; and 
 
3. Work with sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalization, 
which we need to address. 
 
And success in Prevent will mean: 
1. There is a reduction in support for terrorism of all kinds in this country and in 
states overseas whose security most impacts on our own; 
 
2. There is more effective challenge to those extremists whose views are shared 
by terrorist organizations and used by terrorists to legitimize violence; and 
 
3. There is more challenge to and isolations of extremists and terrorists operating 
on the Internet.  
 
Objective One: The Ideological Challenge. Prevent determines challenging 
ideology as an essential part of its counter terrorism strategy because “ideology is one of 
the key characteristics of terrorism and a central factor in the radicalization process.”122 
Therefore, it utilizes projects in education, communities, and the criminal justice system 
that “enable people to effectively challenge terrorist ideology;” however, it specifies that 
it will not engage in matters of theology, but rather will support the key roles of mosques 
and imams who have already taken a leading role in reaching and engaging with young 
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Muslims as well as ensure that work done by theologians, academics, and communities is 
wide circulated. Examples programs of this nature funded by Prevent include: 
 The Islam Citizenship Education Project - develops educational projects within 
madrassas and universities that encourage and develop awareness of extremist 
speakers on campus and balance them with speakers of different perspectives. 
 
 National Offender Management Service - supports Muslim chaplains in prisons to 
challenge extremist views. 
 
 Radical Middle Way - a Muslim-led project which specializes in bringing 
traditional Muslim scholars to speak to young British Muslim audiences. 
 
 M-Power - reaches out to young Somalis to provide them with safe discussion 
spaces to debate issues such as radicalization, terrorism and democracy. 
 
 The FCO and DCLG also sponsored a series of ‘road shows’ by Muslim 
community groups around the country involving lectures, debates and cultural 
events aimed at promoting a mainstream message of Islam on a number of key 
issues, including terrorism. The FCO supported further initiatives overseas, 
networking imams from this country with counterparts elsewhere to understand 
extremist issues and how they might best be addressed. 
 
Furthermore, the Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU) was 
established in the Office of Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) in order to conduct 
research and develop proposals on ways to describe the terrorist threat. It aimed to 
primarily work with local and national organizations to develop and disseminate counter 
narratives and has focused on geographical areas where evidence indicates high levels of 
extremist propaganda. “In its first few years, RICU developed proposals about ways to 
describe the terrorist threat which were accurate, likely to be understood and accepted but 
which would not inadvertently lend credence to the claims about counter-terrorism made 
by extremist and terrorist groups. Some of these proposals were adopted by Government 
and reflected in the language which Government used (the term ‘war on terrorism’, for 
example, was judged to be prone to misinterpretation and has generally been avoided in 
48 
this country).”123 The work on producing counter-narratives, however, has been described 
as ‘variable’ and ‘not as successful as we want,’ in separate documents. Their work 
struggled to have an impact and was difficult to evaluate. “Although RICU was right to 
focus on working with local and national organizations to develop and disseminate 
counter-narratives, some of those organizations have struggled to make themselves heard 
and failed to draw a clear line between messages about counter-narrative and cohesion. 
More care now needs to be taken to identify credible partners and to develop powerful 
and specific narratives across a range of communications channels, especially on the 
Internet.”124 In reference to future expectations of RICU it was expressed, “much greater 
emphasis will also be given to measuring the impact of RICU’s programme,” and “to 
ensure value for money, there will be independent scrutiny of RICU’s projects and the 
help they provide to non-Government organizations.”125  
Prevent also utilizes censorship methods as part of its strategy. Given that social 
media and the Internet are thoroughly utilized by Islamist groups, “removing terrorist 
material remains a high priority” for CONTEST and Prevent.126 Per the laws in the UK, 
the government is permitted to remove Internet content that is deemed conducive to 
terrorism. A dedicated specialist police unit, the Counter-Terrorism Internet Referral Unit 
(CTIRU), has continued to be funded to refer content that breaches UK terrorism 
legislation. In 2014, the volume of unlawful content removed was at about 46,000 and 
about 70% of CTIRU’s caseload was related to Syria and Iraq.127 Between 2010 and 
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2011, over 4,000 URLs were taken down.
128
 The increase in material removed is 
attributed to a new public referral platform that was launched in March 2014. A newer, 
Internet-related initiative involves engagement with the Internet industry to see whether 
filtering products are an effective tool to protect vulnerable people from content that is 
not illegal, but is extremist and possible harmful. In a more extreme censorship method, 
the Home Secretary, equivalent to the U.S. Secretary of State, has the power to exclude 
or deport non-British citizens on grounds of national security if they engage in what is 
termed ‘unacceptable behavior.’ By 2011, over 130 individuals had been excluded and in 
the 2012 reports it was stated that increasing using of this power has been made. 
The 2011 revision found several issues in regards to the implementation and 
effectiveness of activities geared towards responding to ideological threats. The first issue 
identified was the absence of a clear explanation of ideology and “what it means, what it 
includes and what needs to be done about it and by whom.” Further issues of clarity were 
found, including the lack of a clear audience, of direct impact on those targeted, and of 
overall understanding on how terrorist ideologies draw on and make use of extremist 
ideologies. However, as of the 2012 annual reports, the government has reportedly 
significantly improved its understanding of the people and organizations who are most 
heavily engaged in radicalization. It claims to having learned that far right and Islamist 
groups “feed off one another and try to create enmity, suspicion, and hatred between our 
communities” with their respective ideologies that are each anti-democratic, intolerant, 
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and conducive to violence.
129
 Regardless, the Prevent strategy repeatedly recognized the 
need for further research in various areas in 2011, and given the also recognized evolving 
nature of the threat, it is likely that the need for further research remains in 2015. 
Objective Two: Protecting Vulnerable People. “This area of Prevent is based 
on the premise that people being drawn into radicalization and recruitment can be 
identified and then provided with support.”130 The purpose of the support is to dissuade 
individuals from engaging in terrorist related activity and to remove them from the sphere 
of terrorist influence and contact. Allegations have been made that efforts in this area of 
Prevent go against freedom of expression and are a form of spying and intelligence 
gathering for the sake of policing. To rebut, the revised strategy states, “taking early 
action to protect people from radicalization is not the same as surveillance or intelligence 
gathering. It is intended to pre-empt not to facilitate law enforcement.”131 It is posited that 
if carried out proportionally and handled properly, programs in this area can work to 
positively influence cognitive and behavioral change related to terrorist tendencies. 
The majority of the activity in this area has been delivered through Channel, “a 
police-coordinated, multi-agency partnership that evaluates referrals of individuals at risk 
of being drawn into terrorism, working alongside safeguarding partnerships and crime 
reduction panels.”132 The referral process is comprised of three steps: identification, risk 
and assessment, and referral and support. The identifications go through frontline staff 
who are responsible for assessing the individuals reported to them as to whether or not 
they are at risk of being drawn towards terrorism. As of 2011, Channel covered about 75 
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local authorities and 12 police forces. The Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent has 
been developed to help coordinators identify signs of vulnerability and has been delivered 
to roughly 15,000 frontline staff. Following identification, those deemed as vulnerable 
are referred to coordinators, typically from a police background, who assess the 
individual and decide whether or not they should move onto the support stage or exit the 
program. If the coordinator decides to advance the individual onto the support stage, 
various options are available such as counseling, faith guidance, and civic engagement. 
Various institutions have provided these services, including community-based projects 
funded by local authorities, local religious or community leaders, teachers and 
organizations directly funded by the OSCT. 
Overall, the use of Channel to identify and intercept those at risk of radicalization 
has provided a set of statistics that can be used to tangibly gauge progress, something that 
is near absent in other areas of evaluation. Since December 2010, 1120 people have been 
referred to the Channel program, 286 of which were assessed to be in need of an 
intervention.
133
 Though not mentioned in the 2011 revision, a noteworthy statistic from 
Sir Norman Bettison, the lead for Prevent Policing of the Association of Chief Police 
Officers, states that, “thus far, not one of the 1,500 people that have been intervened with 
have been arrested for any terrorist related offence.”134 This demonstrates the 
implementation of Prevent’s aim to use soft power as a counter-narrative.  
Objective Three: Supporting sectors and institutions where there are risks of 
radicalization. Based off of evidence that suggests radicalization occurs in places where 
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terrorist ideologies go uncontested, this part of the strategy aims to work with institutions 
within those places to ensure there is an understanding of radicalization and how to 
develop an effective response. These areas are schools and children, higher education, the 
internet, faith institutions, health, the criminal justice system, the charitable sector and 
overseas. Prevent engages specifically with these sectors because it is believed that they 
are capable of addressing and resolving some of the challenges posed by radicalization. 
Given the wide range of sectors, Prevent recognizes that it needs to be extremely flexible 
when working with each of these sectors; indeed, “measures that are suitable in a prison 
will not be suitable in a university.”135 Generally speaking, within each of these sectors, 
Prevent seeks to equip existing institutions with information and support necessary to 
recognize, assess and deal with symptoms of radicalization. For example, informational 
DVD’s have been provided to primary schools for teachers to present to children and 
student unions of university campuses are being utilized to disseminate counter-extremist 
narratives.  
In the end, the UK’s Prevent strategy has fully surfaced as an all-encompassing 
CVE program. Though it has seen heavy criticisms of spying on its citizens and being 
too-broadly based, it is a robust program with intentions of addressing the roots of 
terrorism and is currently in the process of correcting its mistakes and fine-tuning its 
capabilities. 
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Saudi Arabia’s PRAC Strategy 
The CVE program in Saudi Arabia materialized in response to militant Islamist 
domestic terror campaigns between the years of 1995 and 2003. Like the UK program, 
Saudi Arabia recognized that security measures alone could not effectively address the 
issue of violent extremism and therefore developed the Prevention, Rehabilitation, and 
Aftercare (PRAC) strategy. Also like the UK, Saudi Arabia sees violent extremism as a 
result of radical ideologies, specifically radical Islam. However, unlike the UK, Saudi 
Arabia has the advantage of being able to address the messages of radical Islam from a 
point of legitimacy due to its Islamic roots. Thus, the PRAC strategy aims to “cast 
extremism as illegitimate for having perverted true Islam” and “aspires to help misguided 
believers return to the correct understandings of Islam.”136 Where a key concern of 
Prevent is avoiding taking the position of religious arbiter, Saudi Arabia and PRAC seek 
to do just that. In doing so, Saudi Arabia’s CVE program not only works to advocate and 
develop an Islam supported by the government, but also works to reaffirm state 
authority.
137
 
PRAC is composed of three separate but integrated programs: 
1. Deterring individuals from becoming involved in extremism. 
2. Rehabilitation of extremists and individuals who get involved with them. 
3. Providing aftercare programs to facilitate reintegration into society after 
their release from custody. 
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Prevention. The government has established hundreds of programs aimed at 
prevention, ranging from educational programs to advertisement programs. These 
institutions, most of which are implemented through the “guidance department” at the 
Ministry of Interior, are designed to short-circuit radicalization by confronting extremism 
through the promotion of a moderate, pious Islam. The target audience of this effort isn’t 
extremists, but rather the larger population that may sympathize and support extremism 
and beliefs that might lead to extremism. In essence, this part of PRAC is similar to 
Objective Three in Prevent, in that it works with existing institutions in order to develop 
and disseminate a counter-narrative to violent extremism. The difference with this area of 
PRAC, as mentioned before, is the ability to utilize religion as a means to develop that 
counter-narrative. Examples include: 
1. Some schools hold writing contests and art competitions in which students 
“depict different topics such as the impact of terrorism on the population or 
the role of the public in protecting the country from terrorism.”138 
 
2. Evidence suggests that a large portion of radicalization within schools come 
from teachers who use their position to preach radical ideas to their students. 
Thus, a teacher monitoring process has been implemented that sends 
problematic teachers to King Fahd Security College where they go through a 
series of five classes aimed at retraining. Those with little progress are placed 
in positions away from students while those who fail to progress are 
dismissed. 
 
3. Government supported activities such as sporting events, car racing, and 
camel racing in an effort replace summer camps and questionable religious 
retreats often organized by extremist groups. 
 
4. Large-scale public information and communication campaigns utilize 
billboards and other advertisements to focus on the evils of terrorism and 
support moderate Islam. One image featured two clasped hands, one of a 
person in traditional Arab dress, and the other in uniform, encouraging 
cooperation with security personnel and shunning extremists. 
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Rehabilitation. Where the Prevention area of PRAC is focused on the population 
surrounding extremists, this section is a concerted effort geared towards rehabilitating 
and reeducating violent extremists and its sympathizers through “intensive religious 
debates and psychological counseling.”139 The center of gravity for this area is a 
counseling program that is administered by the Advisory Committee in the Ministry of 
Interior. This Advisory Committee is made up of four subcommittees, each tasked with 
different portions of the counseling process. The Religious Subcommittee is the largest 
one, made up of over 100 clerics, scholars and university professors, and engages in 
religious dialogue and debate with detainees. The Psychological and Social 
Subcommittee, comprised of roughly 50 psychologists, psychiatrists, social scientists and 
researchers, is responsible for evaluating a detainee’s behavior and psychological 
progress throughout the program. The Security Subcommittee is tasked with monitoring 
security risks, behavior and making release recommendations. They are also responsible 
for monitoring detainees after release. Lastly, the Media Subcommittee produces 
materials that reinforce various messages that counter extremist ideas and support basic 
tenets of Islam. These materials are used throughout mosques and schools and come in 
various formats such pamphlets, books and TV programs. Together, these subcommittees 
work together to convey to the prisoners that extremists do not care about them, but 
rather use them to advance their own violent agendas. In conjunction, the subcommittees 
work to demonstrate that they and the Saudi government do care about them and that it 
will do as much as it can to support them. 
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The counseling process begins inside prison and subsequently moves to a 
rehabilitation facility. Central to the success of the rehabilitation program has been the 
declaration on behalf of the Advisory Committee upon initially meeting a prisoner that 
they are not employed by or associated with the Ministry of Interior. Instead, they stress 
that they are independent religious scholars, which is intended to create a necessary level 
of credibility in the eyes of the prisoner. Furthermore, the program stresses that those 
interacting with detainees must not lecture them, but instead engage with them in 
discussion and debate. Thus, in the first meeting, Advisory Committee members simply 
listen to the detainee and ask questions regarding the motivations behind their actions and 
their beliefs.  Only after listening to the detainee explain their motives and opinions do 
the scholars attempt to convince them that the religious justifications for their actions are 
wrong and based upon a corrupted, incomplete understanding of Islam. To do this, the 
Advisory Committee runs two programs, one short program lasting a couple of hours and 
a long program that lasts several weeks. After the respective program is complete, an 
exam is given to address the prisoner’s progress. Those who pass the exam move onto the 
next phase, those who do not pass repeat the course. Due to the discursive nature of this 
process, the advancement from one stage to the next is not always clear. 
Though significant attention is attributed towards counseling and reeducating the 
prisoner, similar, if not equal attention is given to the prisoner’s family. If the prisoner is 
the head of the household, the Advisory Committee has the ability to support the 
prisoner’s family by providing them with an alternate salary, schooling and health care. 
The motive behind this is “to offset any hardship and further radicalization brought on by 
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the arrest of family members.”140 Thus, not only is the issue of radical ideologies 
addressed at the individual level, but it is also mitigated at the family level. 
Aftercare Programs. Aftercare programs work to ease the process of 
transitioning from life within the program into society. Once a prisoner has completed the 
previous process to the satisfaction of the Advisory Committee members, they are 
transferred to an external rehabilitation facility. This facility, called the Care 
Rehabilitation Center (CRC), acts as a halfway house, facilitating the transition back into 
society. The CRC offers an improved living environment from prison; detainees live in 
dormitory-style housing, have access to open grassy areas, and participate in group 
activities. Additionally, guards in the CRC do not wear uniforms and frequently socialize 
with detainees, often participating with them in group sports. The CRC provides the 
detainee with brief and recurring exposure to life outside the state’s custody while also 
providing staff members the ability to observe and monitor the detainees behavior in an 
environment that is similar to real life, allowing them to test the sincerity of the detainees 
progress.  After spending roughly 8-12 weeks at the CRC, the detainee will be released if 
staff members deem they are ready. 
Once they are released, continuous social support is provided in order to prevent 
recidivism. Such support includes assistance in locating a job, obtaining a mode of 
transportation and leasing an apartment. Furthermore, former detainees are encouraged to 
continue meeting with those staff members they interacting with while in the program. 
They are also encouraged to settle down and start a family, since evidence suggests doing 
so will likely prevent any engagement in violence. To support this, the government offers 
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to pay for weddings, dowries and other pre-marriage arrangements. In essence, through 
these efforts, the PRAC strategy goes beyond the end of the program to continue support 
and ensure sustainment.
141
 
 
United States 
In 2011, the White House published Empowering Local Partners to Prevent 
Violent Extremism in the United States and its subsequent Strategic Implementation Plan 
(SIP), both of which emanate from the National Security Strategy published in May of 
2011 and embody the US CVE programs. The SIP was ultimately the product of 
collaboration between various agencies including DOJ, FBI, DOS, DOD, HHS, and 
NCTC and it determined that traditional national security or law enforcement agencies 
such as DHS, DOJ, and the FBI would execute many of the programs and activities 
outlined. As such, DOJ, DHS, and NCTC selected three cities, Boston, Los Angeles, and 
Minneapolis, to run pilot CVE programs “to identify promising practices” that would 
inform and inspire community efforts to help eliminate conditions that lead to alienation 
and violent extremism. According to the Attorneys General office, these cities were 
chosen “based on their existing achievements with community engagement;” however, 
considering the Boston Marathon attacks in 2015 and the fact that Minneapolis is home to 
the largest Somali community in the U.S. from which several individuals have left to join 
al-Shabaab, the reason for the choice of these cities is up for argument. Led by the U.S. 
Attorneys in each district, these cities developed CVE frameworks that outlined the ideas 
and efforts to be pursued in order to meet the stated goals. Across the board, each pilot 
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program aims to engage the local community such that all efforts are community-driven. 
Additionally, each program seeks to utilize the collaboration of some combination of 
government agencies and non-government local stakeholders such as Non-governmental 
Organizations (NGO), social service providers, schools, and faith-based organizations.  
Los Angeles. The LA Framework
142
 was published in February 2015 after years 
of development between multiple agencies and stakeholders. The three pillars of the 
framework are prevention, intervention, and interdiction, which are meant to mitigate a 
variety of risk factors, as described below:  
Prevention addresses communal needs and focuses on expanding engagement as 
well as promoting healthy and resilient communities through community-driven 
programs and initiatives. Intervention, or “Off Ramps,” focuses on individual 
needs. The interdiction component addresses security and community safety risks. 
Both prevention and intervention are early mechanisms of risk mitigation, 
whereas interdiction is a mechanism for disrupting criminal threats. 
 
Prevention in the framework is defined as collective efforts aimed at closing a 
range of gaps and social openings by which violent ideologies can find legitimacy. 
Prevention is achieved, according to the framework, through the progression of 
expanding engagement, building networks, and collaboratively delivering community 
driven programs. These prevention strategies “aim to build healthy, resilient communities 
where it is more difficult for violent ideologies to take root,” and form the bedrock of the 
LA Framework. 
Expanding Engagement. The engagement component of prevention is meant to 
produce ongoing dialogue between government agencies and the local community, in 
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which the government agencies are to be at the forefront of the engagement efforts. 
Formats identified for government-driven engagements include public forums, town 
halls, and interfaith events, among others. The City of Los Angeles Human Relations 
Commission (City HRC), an already existing entity that provides a space to convene 
diverse communities and connect needed resources, plays an active role in advocating for 
access and inclusion of diverse communities, which local community leaders reciprocate 
to create open, two-way dialogue. Additionally, law enforcement agencies are to work 
towards strengthening trust and building community partnerships through community 
policing and engagement strategies aimed at effectively addressing community needs and 
concerns. 
Building Networks. Through such engagement strategies, the framework seeks to 
build and establish networks, defined as relationships with key partners that can build 
coalitions, provide resources, and expand the reach of community-based programs. At the 
time of publishing, the city was in the early stages of creating sustainable networks and 
identified overarching categories of potential partners such as the Department of Mental 
Health in the public sector and media companies in the private sector. The framework 
claims that the city, in the months before publishing, “had begun to move in the direction 
of expanding these networks of partners.” 
Community-Led Initiatives. Lastly, the framework seeks to utilize and deliver 
community-led initiatives, which may be entirely separate from CVE itself but still 
relevant. Examples of this include academic programs such as Bayan Clermont, social 
service organizations such as the Niswa Association, and faith-based partnerships such as 
the New Ground. While these are examples of initiatives that exist and operate separate 
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from CVE, there are also CVE-specific examples such as the Safe Spaces Initiative run 
by the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC). Next steps in the area are stated to 
include the need to establish more direct links between the networks established 
mentioned above, and these community driven initiatives in effort to identify and provide 
needed resources to support them. “Overall, community-driven local programs aim to 
address challenges around identity formation, integration, intergroup relations, political 
discourse, and social services.” 
While prevention programs focus on fostering community resiliency, stakeholders 
involved with the LA Framework have been working to build a comprehensive, 
community-led intervention program that would provide individuals already deemed to 
be on a path towards violent extremism with so-called “off-ramps.” These “off-ramps” 
are meant to provide rehabilitative care in the form of social services, mental health, 
faith-based and other services for at-risk individuals in effort to steer them off the path 
towards violent extremism. The framework proclaims that no formal intervention 
program currently exists, but that “interventions do occur by parents, educators, members 
of clergy, and others when individuals who need help are identified.” The framework 
goes on to explain that there are several outstanding issues that need to be addressed 
before making a formal program; these issues are as follows: 
 A reliable analysis and assessment of legal liabilities for interveners; 
 
 A more robust inventory of available resources; 
 
 Strategies to ensure that concerns about civil rights, civil liberties, and data 
privacy protection are adequately addressed; 
 
 Credible research-based baselines for indicators of violent extremism; and 
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 A mechanism for providing collaborative input into the intervention process that 
avoids securitizing the process, while recognizing potential risks to the 
community and ensuring appropriate mitigation responses are utilized. 
 
The framework describes interdiction efforts, such as investigation, arrest, and 
potential prosecution, as an important component that is “critical to stopping individuals 
who are intent on committing violence, investigating crimes associated with extremist 
violence, creating an environment where the public feels safe to go about their daily lives, 
and serving as a deterrent to those who may aspire to commit acts of violence.” The 
framework notes, however, that efforts are being made within law enforcement to ensure, 
whenever appropriate, that alternatives to interdiction are maximized. 
Challenges. The complexity of the framework and its components is duly 
recognized at its end, including the following challenges in going forward. 
1. Identifying and increasing access to additional resources, grants, and other 
funding sources to facilitate and support capacity-building and 
community-driven initiatives.  
 
2. Expanding prevention efforts networks within and across neighboring 
counties to ensure continuity and to facilitate a “regional” and “whole of 
nation” approach.  
 
3. Expanding and enhancing engagement efforts with women and youth so 
that stronger partnerships and leadership can be developed within those 
groups.  
 
4. Expanding networks to better link with local education, mental health, 
emergency management, and health and social services organizations.  
5. Addressing the complex legal and liability issues that arise in the context 
of developing intervention models. 
  
6. Developing capacity for enhanced outreach and social media influence, 
both at a government and community-based level.  
 
7. Developing better methodologies for effectively measuring the impact of 
CVE outreach, engagement methods, and initiatives. 
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8. Addressing community reluctance to engage with government partners, 
including a pervasive grassroots antipathy to the concept of “CVE,” 
entrenched negative perception of law enforcement, and a view that law 
enforcement methods securitize relationships, stigmatize communities, 
violate privacy rights and civil liberties, and constitute a form of spying. 
  
9. Engaging with the community to clarify and discuss the methods, 
independent oversight procedures, and goals of law enforcement in its 
fight against violent extremism.  
10. Given limited resources, engaging in continuous efforts to counter the 
narrative of extremists, while balancing the need to address day-to-day 
crime.  
 
11. Enhancing civic engagement that reaches more grassroots community 
members and not just community leaders. 
 
Boston: A Framework for Prevention and Intervention Strategies. The 
Boston Framework
143
, published in February of 2015, is set up in a way to incorporate 
violent extremism into already existing violent prevention efforts. United States Attorney 
Carmen M. Ortiz states in the framework’s introduction, “throughout my tenure, I have 
worked with nontraditional partners, like schools, service providers and academia, to find 
ways to reduce gun and gang violence through non-law enforcement methods.  I believe 
that these innovative strategies are not only effective, but necessary in order to develop a 
framework to counter violent extremism in the Greater Boston region.” She goes on to 
explain that the efforts outlined in the framework are meant to complement, not replace, 
traditional tools of law enforcement. Like the other two frameworks, the Boston 
Framework is the product of collaboration between various agencies and stakeholders in 
the Greater Boston region, coordinated by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of 
Massachusetts. 
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The goal of the framework is “to increase the capacity of community and 
government as a way to protect vulnerable individuals from engagement in and the nation 
from violent extremism.” Violent extremists are defined as “individuals who support or 
commit ideologically-motivated violence to further personal, political or social 
objectives, sometimes without direction from or influence by a foreign actor,” and 
countering violent extremism is considered as focusing “on using prevention and 
intervention approaches as a way to minimize the risk of individuals being inspired by 
violent extremist ideologies or recruited by violent extremist groups.” As such, to achieve 
the goal, the frame has been designed to “allow local communities the flexibility to 
define their problem areas, create achievable goals and objectives, and develop realistic 
implementation plans,” such that the specific needs of the local community can be met. 
The framework clarifies, however, that for the Greater Boston region, CVE efforts 
do not include a law enforcement suppression component, such as the “Interdiction” 
component of the LA Framework. Rather, those suppression components are considered 
to be a part of counterterrorism efforts and are utilized once an individual has begun to 
prepare for or engage in ideologically motivated violence. Furthermore, such that the 
framework aims to act as an extension of existing violence prevention and intervention 
strategies, it is noted that the proposed solutions “are not entirely unique from other 
prevention related strategies that are currently being implemented (or can be 
implemented) through broader efforts by public health, mental health, non-profit 
organizations, private partnerships, government and others. Rather than create a program 
specifically labeled Countering Violent Extremism, a more effective approach might be 
to expand the capacity and resources of agencies and organizations to ensure that they are 
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able to enhance the work that they are already doing as well as leverage existing 
successful programs to help address violent extremism.” This is due to the fact that 
endorsing specific CVE programs for a certain community that has not specifically asked 
for such programs could stigmatize the program and its efforts, which could be 
counterproductive and lead to further disenfranchised individuals.  
Considering these complexities among others when working towards the states’ 
goal, the framework is formatted in a way that identifies problem areas and follows them 
with solutions to consider: 
1. Some young people may be at greater risk of feeling isolated and 
alienated, making them more vulnerable to recruitment by violent 
extremists. 
 
2. Providing services to individuals before mobilization toward violent 
extremism is challenging when there is a lack of understanding regarding 
violent extremism and limited intervention programs. 
 
3. Social media and other media platforms are being used to recruit 
individuals to join extremist groups and to encourage individuals to 
engage in violence. 
 
4. U.S. policy and events around the globe can frustrate, anger and, at times, 
influence some to think that there is no effective alternative other than to 
express grievances or solidarity through the use of violence. 
 
5. Distrust between government and non-government hinders collaboration 
and effective decision-making and problem solving. 
 
6. Lack of knowledge in mainstream society regarding religions, cultures and 
thought systems which are unfamiliar or are maligned in the media, 
contributes to poor perceptions that fuel and mutually reinforce fear and 
estrangement. 
 
7. Individuals convicted of hate crimes and terrorism offenses require 
specialized support and services before and after release from prison. 
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Minneapolis-St. Paul Framework. The Minneapolis framework
144
 largely rests 
on the fact that the city is home to the largest Somali immigrant population in the United 
States and aims to build off of the alleged long-standing relationship between the Somali 
community and local law enforcement. The framework states that several police 
departments, including the Hennepin County Sheriff’s Office and St. Paul Police 
Department, regularly host Somali organizations in order to foster and develop an open 
dialogue such that they can work together to stem the tide of recruitment into extremist 
groups. The shortest and least detailed framework among the three, it was developed 
“after months of listening to the community about its needs as well as reviewing available 
research and talking with experts.” After identifying the root causes of radicalization, the 
framework describes three components--engagement, prevention, and intervention—it 
will utilize to address the causes, which, due to its brevity, will be listed in full. 
Root causes: 
 Disaffected youth, 
 A deepening disconnect between youth and religious leaders, 
 Internal identity crisis, 
 Community isolation, 
 Lack of opportunity—including high unemployment, lack of activities for 
youth, and few mentors. 
 
The framework envisions more engagement between law enforcement and the 
community to continue to build trust and develop relationships. There are several Somali 
officers in local law enforcement. They are highly successful and well thought of in the 
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community. The framework includes support for additional Somali law enforcement 
officers, including increasing the number of entry-level positions, such as Community 
Liaison Officers and Parking Enforcement Officers, with the goal of guiding and 
mentoring candidates into full-time officer positions. In addition to continuing to build up 
law enforcement engagement, trust and relationships need to be enhanced with other 
partners and local stakeholders. This includes city, county and state government agencies 
and corporations working to increase their engagement and connection to Somali 
Minnesotans. Another component of this framework brings in federal agency partners 
such as the Transportation Security Administration and U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection to help educate community members on airport screening processes and 
provide direct assistance to community members that have expressed airport related 
concerns.  
Similar to other prevention strategies, the framework includes an increase in 
youth programming such as after-school activities and mentor programs, higher 
education scholarships and job opportunities. There will also be a social media campaign 
providing positive messaging to the Somali community. As true in other at-risk 
populations, providing more opportunities and positive messages for youth increases 
public safety. Somali Minnesotan youth are an underserved community. The federal 
government has a successful history working with local communities and providing 
funding, research and other support for youth programming and mentoring. The Pilot 
Program Framework envisions expanding these programs to include Somali Minnesota 
youth. The Pilot Program has already brought together several partner organizations to 
develop culturally competent programming.  
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 There will be two intervention models developed, one working within the school 
systems and one working within the community. Both will be community-led. The school 
model will expand a current model, which connects youth workers from the community, 
bridging the gap between youth, their parents and the school system. These workers will 
spend time in the lunchroom and in non-classroom settings, building relationships and 
trust at school. They will provide connections and continuity during school and after for 
both parents and the students. The second intervention model is based on community 
volunteers, with mothers, community organizations, religious leaders and mental health 
professionals working directly with families before law enforcement is ever involved.  
 
Conclusions 
Though the CVE programs in the UK and Saudi Arabia are each profoundly 
shaped by cultural, political, and legal elements unique to its country, the challenges 
faced by the Prevent strategy and the religious nature of the PRAC strategy bear useful 
insights for the further implementation of the CVE programs in the U.S. Firstly, the 
challenge faced by the Prevent strategy regarding the securitization of CVE programs is 
an important lesson to heed. As described by Khalida Khan, a British-Muslim activist and 
founder of the An-Nisa Society, an organization focused on the welfare of British-
Muslim families, “we believe that it will be more productive for the government to build 
trust, and address the needs of the Muslim community in the interest of social justice, 
rather than through the lens of anti-terrorism;”145 because “without the prerequisite of 
trust and long established engagement, local authorities, police and others are likely to 
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find suspicion and distrust [from Muslim communities] if their first encounter is about 
preventing violent extremism.”146 Such distrust and suspicious will and has proven to be 
counterproductive in regards to the goals of Prevent, and will likely be as well for U.S. 
CVE policies. However, ways in which to effectively avoid securitization of CVE 
policies while still addressing and achieving the goals of CVE have yet to be established. 
Second, in regards to the effectiveness of the RICU in Prevent concerning its 
work in producing and disseminating counter-narratives, it was noted that, while the 
endeavor was well-placed, it failed to make an impact as much of the work done was not 
thoroughly circulated. As a result, it was stated that further research was needed on how 
to create powerful and specific narratives that will reach and impact the intended 
audiences. This, too, is an important lesson for the U.S. to heed, as there are various 
Islamic organizations actively working against militant Islamist ideology and terrorism 
that could benefit from being more widely circulated.  
While the U.S. does not have the ability to claim religious legitimacy in its CVE 
programs as Saudi Arabia does, the way in which Saudi Arabia uses its religious 
authority to implement its PRAC strategy points to the importance of Muslim 
communities and Islamic organizations in the U.S. To start, the use of school writing 
programs and extra-curricular activities in the prevention area of PRAC is worth 
exploring, as it provides young individuals with formal, yet interactive organizations and 
activities through which they can meld their Islamic and national backgrounds as 
mentioned in Chapter One. Furthermore, the use of intensive religious debates in the 
rehabilitation area of the strategy indicates the importance of an open, safe space through 
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which individuals can discuss relevant ideas and theology under the instruction of 
religious clerics.
147
 These debates allow individuals to discuss militant Islamist ideology 
as well as become exposed to other interpretations of Islam in order to hopefully decide 
against militancy.  
The pilot programs of the U.S. noticeably address these lessons in one way or 
another, by nominally stating the goal of engaging with communities and working with 
existing efforts, including non-CVE related ones, and religious organizations; however, 
in implementing these programs, it is important to keep in mind the reason for the 
policies, which in this case is to empower American communities to prevent violent 
extremism 
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CHAPTER THREE: CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
All things considered, several clear guidelines emerge for the continuation of 
CVE policy in the U.S in regards to addressing militant Islamist ideology. The 
importance of Muslim communities has been repeatedly stated throughout the academic 
and policy worlds; however, in light of the lessons learned in Chapter One, it can be seen 
why they are significant.
148
 Those who are potentially at risk of radicalization are, as the 
Minneapolis framework suggests, searching for their identity, for their place, in U.S. 
society. They are working to successfully merge all aspects of their background—their 
ethnicity, religion, nationality, family etc.—into one cohesive identity. Given the current 
state of turmoil surrounding the religion of Islam and it’s followers, such an endeavor has 
become increasingly more difficult over the years as different parts of their background 
seem to clash. Essentially, they are working to establish what it means to be a Muslim 
American, or whether the merging of those two identities is possible.
149
 The experiences 
they have during this process will likely shape their conclusion, which, in a roundabout 
way, has the potential to determine whether or not they turn towards Islamist or militant 
Islamist ideologies. As demonstrated in the first chapter, militant Islamist ideology is 
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readily available to fulfill an individual’s need for identity. This points to the absolute 
importance of the incorporation of the Muslim community, an importance that has been 
recognized in all three U.S. Pilot Programs as well as in the UK’s Prevent Program. 
Earlier, it was mentioned that by looking at what militant Islamist ideology 
provides its adherents, policy makers can work to develop alternative, non-violent means 
by which similar notions can be achieved. Militant Islamist ideology provides individuals 
with a sense of purpose, a cause to believe in, and solutions to their problems. As 
Dawson described, these are the benefits individuals believe they are obtaining from 
militant Islamist ideology. This simply means that these individuals need to be able to 
find those values to an equal or greater degree here in the Unites States. As the 
Minneapolis-St.Paul Framework lists, there is a lack of opportunity for those in danger of 
becoming radicalized. Of course, there are plenty of existing social programs throughout 
each state that are meant to develop and provide these benefits; however, the degree to 
which they are being utilized by immigrant and Muslim communities is worth studying 
and improving upon. Thus, the endeavor to provide such programs as listed in the Pilot 
Programs is a step in the right direction; however, as mentioned by the Boston 
Framework and demonstrated by the U.K. Prevent program, providing these programs 
solely for the sake of individuals not becoming radicalized, or ‘securitizing’ them, makes 
the effort disingenuous and could possibly further isolate and alienate the Muslim 
community.
150
 Thus, this thesis agrees with the approach of the Boston Framework, in 
which it is working to build off of already existing initiatives without necessarily 
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associating them with CVE. In this case, it is mostly outreach efforts that need to be 
aggressively pursued in order to reach and gain participation of the Muslim community in 
already existing social programs meant to foster community involvement. 
Law enforcement, of course, plays a crucial role in CVE and the larger counter-
terrorism strategy. In an even broader sense, they also play a crucial role in making 
communities feel safe and defending and representing the values and laws of the United 
States.
151
  All of these roles can and will likely have an impact on a Muslim’s pursuit to 
establish their identity as a Muslim American, whether positive or negative. As all of the 
CVE programs demonstrated, there are separate stages of CVE depending on the degree 
to which an individual has become radicalized. Each stage merits a different response and 
participation of law enforcement. Considering the role of identity, the preemptive stage of 
CVE is of particular importance. This is the stage where law enforcement can, arguably, 
have the most impact. The more the Muslim community sees that law enforcement is on 
‘their side,’ through interacting with them and providing services and protection, the 
more they are likely to feel a part of and identify with the American community.
152
 An 
unfortunate though somewhat understandable byproduct of the War of Terror has been an 
increase in ‘Islamophobia’ and Islamophobic attacks against Muslims and Islamic 
symbols. While an unfortunate situation, such events provide opportunities for law 
                                                 
151
 Jerome P. Bjelopera, Countering Violent Extremism in the United States; 9, 12. 
152
 Hedieh Mirahamadi, “Partnering With Muslim Communities to Counter 
Radicalization,” 97, In “Countering Violence Extremism Scientific Methods & 
Strategies,” 7, edited by Laurie Fenstermacher and Todd Leventhal. Air Force Research 
Laboratory, 2011. 
74 
enforcement to protect the Muslim community, thereby conveying the message that 
Muslims are protected by the United States.
153
  
Thus, this thesis recommends the following in regards to how to effectively 
address militant Islamist ideology in the implementation of US CVE policy: 
 Strongly consider ways in which to make CVE efforts, particularly in 
outreach and prevention, distinct from counter-terrorism efforts in order to 
avoid securitizing CVE and further isolating the Muslim community. 
 
 Demonstrate consistent fairness and justice in prosecuting hate crimes in 
general, and particularly against the Muslim community in order to 
convey the message that U.S. law enforcement is unbiased and there to 
protect them. Consider publicizing such instances in order to circulate the 
image of U.S. law enforcement protecting Muslim communities.  
 
 Continue to research and pursue methods to amplify and partner with the 
voices of existing Islamic organizations actively working against violent 
extremism.  
 
 Continue to meet with Muslim communities and discuss ways in which to 
improve CVE policies and share with them information that might help in 
local, private CVE programs/efforts, such as ways in which militant 
Islamist recruiters are reaching out to individuals. 
 
 Consider publicizing conjoined efforts and meetings between U.S. 
government and law enforcement with Muslim communities in order to 
convey the image of working with instead of working against Muslim 
communities. 
 
 Allow the space for and seek to facilitate the development of Islamic 
programs and institutions that work to support Muslim families and 
individuals with social services. However, be wary of and continue 
researching the possible effects of directly funding such programs and 
activities. 
 
 Continue to pursue research projects on how to effectively implement and 
measure CVE programs. 
 
                                                 
153
 Jerome P. Bjelopera, Countering Violent Extremism in the United States, 8. 
 
75 
While these suggestions are not directly concerned with the development of 
individual and cultural identities, they will likely help facilitate an environment in which 
Muslim communities can comfortably ally with the U.S. government in CVE efforts 
while developing and providing services that can help individuals develop a Muslim-
American identity. 
In the various fields associated with CVE and terrorism, there are few things that 
scholars agree on. Indeed, definitions for long-standing terms such as terrorism, ideology, 
and identity are by no means established. However, one thing everyone can agree on is 
the complex nature of CVE and its associated concepts. There are seemingly endless 
contributing factors, each worth considering and exploring for their value in the pursuit of 
ending terrorism. This thesis, however, looked at CVE through the lens of identity in 
order to convey its importance and utility in understanding how to best move forward in 
the emerging U.S. CVE policy.  
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APPENDIX 
Due to the mutual rise in Islamist terrorism and the analysis thereof, a variety of 
terms have been and continue to be used to describe the act and perpetrators of Islamist 
terrorism.  Generally speaking, these terms are often some variation or combination of 
the words Islam, jihad, fundamentalist, militant, extremist, and radical. Although choice 
in term usage may seem trivial, it can have broader, unintended implications if done 
carelessly. As Khaled al-Fadl explains, “labels do not just describe; they also judge.”154 
Using one term over another could mistakenly include people and concepts that could 
otherwise be useful in fighting the ideas and people the U.S. is trying to defeat. As such, 
this thesis has deliberately used the terms ‘militant Islamist’ and ‘Islamist terrorism’ in 
order to convey the distinction between formal Islam and the devised ideology and its 
modified definitions.  
Reasoning behind this deliberate choice largely rests on reasoning provided by 
Dr. Khaled Abou el-Fadl, Islamic jurist and Professor of Law at UCLA, in which he uses 
a process of exclusion to choose an appropriate label in his book The Great Theft. Abou 
el-Fadl disqualifies ‘fundamentalist’ due to the fact that ‘all Islamic groups and 
organizations claim to adhere to the fundamentals of Islam.’155 He clarifies that using the 
term to describe Christian groups that insist on the literal meaning of the scripture 
“appears to be quite reasonable;” however, in the Islamic context it is not, because the 
appropriate Arabic word, usuli, means “one who relies on the fundamentals or basics.” 
Therefore, the expression ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ conveys the impression that only 
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fundamentalists follow the basics of the faith, the Qur’an and the hadith. As such, “many 
liberal, progressive, or moderate Muslims would describe themselves as usulis, or 
fundamentalists, without thinking that this carries a negative connotation.”156  
Abou el-Fadl also deems terms such as radical and extremist as unsuitable 
because groups like the Taliban and al-Qaida are not always radical or extremist 
regarding all issues, but rather absolutist. It is for this reason that Abou el-Fadl chooses to 
use the term ‘puritan’ throughout his book to describe such groups; “the earmark of their 
thinking is its absolutist and unequivocal quality.”157 However, this thesis has forgone the 
use of ‘puritan’ due its connotation in the West to the Protestant reform movement in the 
16
th
 and 17
th
 centuries. Thus, another, equally appropriate term was needed. 
 ‘Militant’ is precluded on three accounts. If the term is used to mean willingness 
to use force, Abou el-Fadl argues that Islam, Christianity, and Judaism all accept that the 
use of force is justifiable under certain circumstances. Second, if by ‘militant’ one means 
the use of offensive or aggressive force, he claims that nearly everyone claims to use 
force only in self-defense. Third, if excessive force is meant by the use of ‘militant,’ 
Abou el-Fadl deems it unhelpful as it also applies to many factions and nations. ‘Islamist’ 
is also excluded because generally, it refers to Muslims that believe Islamic theology and 
law should serve as an authoritative frame of reference in any social or political 
condition, but “it does not necessarily mean believing in a theocratic state or imposing 
draconian laws upon an innocent group of people.”158 Despite this, this thesis opts for the 
combination of ‘militant’ and ‘Islamist,’ in that it sufficiently fills the gaps identified by 
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Abou el-Fadl and appropriately maintains the distinction but also relation between Islam 
and militant Islamist ideology. The word ‘militant’ is used to describe the use of 
excessive force and as a modifier of ‘Islamist,’ thereby eliminating any vagueness that 
could be used to describe other militant forces. Similarly, ‘Islamist’ is used to specify the 
group of Muslims who advocate for political Islam, but the use of the modifier ‘militant’ 
further specifies the group of Islamists that are willing to use excessive force to achieve 
their goals.  
Mary Habeck provided similar reasoning in her book Knowing the Enemy, 
although she ultimately chose the use of the term ‘jihadi’. In her argument against the use 
of the terms ‘fundamentalism’ and ‘Islamism’, she states: 
Some analysts have suggested that the attackers should be identified with 
‘fundamentalism’ or ‘Islamism,’ the reforming Islam that calls for a revival of the 
religion and a “return” of Islam to political power. But Islamism likewise 
represents neither a unified nor uniform phenomenon. The term describes, rather, 
a complex of often antagonistic groups with differing beliefs, goals, and 
methodologies for attaining their ends. Some of these groups (such at Turkey’s 
Justice and Development Party [the AK]) are committed to democratic processes 
and to the international system. To identify parties like the AK with the terrorists 
of 9/11 threatens to confuse rather than clarify the situation.
159
 
 
Thus, similar to Abou el-Fadl, she disqualifies the use of Islamism due to its 
vagueness. Her choice of the labels ‘jihadi’ and ‘jihadist’ is made in order to identify 
their “commitment to the violent overthrow of the existing international system and its 
replacement by an all-encompassing Islamic state.” This definition accurately captures 
what is meant in this thesis by the term ‘militant Islamist.’ While this thesis agrees with 
Habeck’s definition, it does not agree with her choice of terms due to it promoting 
conflation of the Islamic and Islamist definitions of jihad. 
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